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Abstract

Computing systems are experiencing an explosive growth, both in complexities and
diversities, ushered in by the proliferation of cloud computing, mobile computing,
and Internet of Things. This growth has also exposed the consequences of unsafe,
insecure, and unreliable computing systems. These all point to the great needs of
sophisticated system validation techniques. Recent advances in research on symbolic
execution has shown great promises for automated software analysis, e.g., generating
test cases, finding bugs, and detecting security vulnerabilities. However, symbolic
execution is mostly adopted to analyze user applications, while modern computing
systems in practice consist of many components shipped by various vendors, besides
user applications, e.g., operating systems, firmware and hardware devices. In this dissertation, we propose versatile binary-level concolic testing, which defines a standard
execution-trace format, and features an open and highly extensible architecture. It
allows easy integration of multiple concrete execution frontends and symbolic execution backends, which significantly improves the applicability and flexibility of symbolic
execution, especially to modern computing systems with various components.
First, we present the design and implementation of CRETE, the infrastructure of
versatile binary-level concolic testing. CRETE provides an open and highly extensible
architecture allowing easy integration of multiple concrete and symbolic execution
environments, which communicate with each other only by exchanging standardized
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traces and test cases. We also present several optimizations for scaling CRETE
to practical user applications. Our experiments show CRETE outperformed stateof-the-art open-source systems for automated program analysis at source-level and
binary-level. It also found numerous bugs that were previously unreported from
mature open-source projects.
Second, we present COD, a framework based on versatile binary-level concolic
testing for automated bug detection and replay of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
Linux kernel modules (LKMs). Our framework automatically generates compact sets
of test cases for COTS LKMs, proactively checks for common kernel bugs, and allows
to reproduce reported bugs repeatedly with actionable test cases. Our experiments
show that COD can effectively detect various kernel bugs, and reports 5 new kernel
vulnerabilities including an unknown flaw that allows non-privileged users to trigger a
kernel panic. With the replay capability of our framework, we patched all the reported
bugs in the Linux kernel upstream, including 3 patches were selected to the stable
release of Linux kernel and back-ported to numerous production kernel versions.
Last, we present how we leverage versatile binary-level concolic testing for systemlevel validation of Systems-on-Chips (SoC). We capture run-time traces of Hardware/Software (HW/SW) components across the entire SoC stack which are emulated by
multiple virtual platforms. Based on segmented traces captured from various SoC
components, we assemble system-level traces and provide interfaces for users to inject system-level assertions to validate. The experimental results demonstrate that
our approach can generate effective system-level test cases crosscutting the entire
HW/SW stack of SoC and triggering an IP firmware bug from user inputs of an IP
utility program, and can catch various bugs with system-level assertions.
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1

1.1

Introduction

Overview

Computing systems are experiencing an explosive growth, both in complexities
and diversities, ushered in by the proliferation of cloud computing, mobile computing, and Internet of Things. This growth has also exposed the consequences of unsafe, insecure, and unreliable computing systems, exemplified by recent high-profile
security breaches and software system failures at major corporations such as British
Airways [105] and Facebook [107]. These all point to the great needs of sophisticated
system validation techniques. Recent advances in research on symbolic execution [58]
has shown great promises for automated software analysis, e.g., generating test cases,
finding bugs, and detecting security vulnerabilities [15–17, 25, 38, 39, 66, 81, 97, 100].
However, symbolic execution is mostly adopted to analyze user applications, while
modern computing systems in practice consist of many components shipped by various vendors, besides user applications, e.g., operating systems, firmware and hardware
devices. How to enable symbolic execution on modern computing systems remains a
major challenge.
In this dissertation, we propose versatile binary-level concolic testing, which defines a standard execution-trace format, and features an open and highly extensible
architecture. It allows easy integration of multiple concrete execution frontends and
symbolic execution backends, which significantly improves the applicability and flex-
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Figure 1.1: The overview of dissertation.
ibility of symbolic execution, especially to modern computing systems with various
components. As shown in Fig. 1.1, this dissertation has three major pieces. First,
we present CRETE, the infrastructure of versatile binary-level concolic testing, with
the detail of its design, implementation, optimization, and evaluation, from which we
demonstrate the proposed approach is scalable and effective to real-world applications. Second, we present COD, a framework based on versatile binary-level concolic
testing for automated bug detection and replay of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
Linux kernel modules. Third, we introduce how we leverage versatile binary-level
concolic testing for hardware/software co-validation of Systems-on-Chips.

1.2
1.2.1

Infrastructure of Versatile Binary-level Concolic Testing
Problem Statement

There have been many recent approaches to symbolic execution [5,6,14,55,86–88,
91, 99, 102, 120]. Generally speaking, these approaches can be classified into two categories: online symbolic execution (e.g., BitBlaze [100], klee [15], and s2 e [25]), and
concolic execution (a.k.a., offline symbolic execution, e.g., CUTE [97], DART [38], and
SAGE [39]). Online symbolic execution closely couples Symbolic Execution Engines
(see) with the System Under Test (sut) and explore all possible execution paths of
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sut online at once. On the other hand, concolic execution decouples see from the
sut through traces, which concretely runs a single execution path of a sut and then
symbolically executes it. Both online and offline symbolic execution are facing two
major challenges for analyzing modern software systems: (1) the sut involves many
types of software for different hardware platforms and (2) the sut involves many
components distributed on different machines and as a whole the sut cannot fit in
any see.
What’s more, modern computing systems consist of many software components
from various vendors, and access to all corresponding source code is rarely feasible.
Even when source code is available, building the code exactly as in the shipped
software product is difficult [12]. Moreover, even if the source code is available,
compilers can optimize it in many unpredictable ways, such as undefined behaviors
in C [23]. Thus, analyses of the software stack of computing systems ought to be at
binary-level, in order to be practical and useful. Analysis at binary-level loses highlevel semantics information from the source code that is critical for efficient symbolic
analysis. It adds extra complications on top of the two open questions of symbolic
execution, namely state explosion and expensive constraint solving. As a result,
optimizations are required to deliver practical techniques that are using symbolic
execution.
1.2.2

Solution Overview

Our approach focuses on how to extend concolic execution to satisfy the needs for
analyzing modern software systems. There are two major observations behind our
efforts on extending concolic execution:
• The decoupled architecture of concolic execution provides the flexibility in integrating new trace-captured frontends for modern platforms.
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• The trace-based nature of concolic testing offers opportunities for synthesizing
system-level traces from different components distributed on different machines.
We present CRETE, a versatile binary-level concolic testing framework, which
features an open and highly extensible architecture allowing easy integration of concrete execution frontends and symbolic execution backends. CRETE’s extensibility
is rooted in its modular design where concrete and symbolic execution is loosely coupled only through standardized execution traces and test cases. The standardized
execution traces are llvm-based, self-contained, and composable, providing succinct
and sufficient information for see to reproduce the concrete executions. The CRETE
framework is composed of:
• A CRETE tracing plugin, which is embedded in the concrete execution
environment, captures binary-level execution traces of the sut, and stores the
traces in a standardized trace format.
• A CRETE manager, which archives the captured execution traces and test
cases, schedules concrete and symbolic execution, and implements policies for
selecting the traces and test cases to be analyzed and explored next.
• A CRETE replayer, which is embedded in the symbolic execution environment, performs concolic execution on standardized traces and collects test cases
generated.
We have implemented the CRETE framework on top of qemu [11] and klee, particularly the tracing plugin for qemu, the replayer for klee, and the manager that
coordinates qemu and klee to exchange runtime traces and test cases and manages the policies for prioritizing runtime traces and test cases. To validate CRETE
extensibility, we have also implemented a tracing plugin for the 8051 emulator [56].
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Intel 8051 series are representatives of microprocessors widely used as independent
micro-controllers for IoT devices or as integrated components in large-scale systemson-chips. Binaries are typically executed on these controllers bare-metal without
runtime systems. Application of concolic testing to such binaries requires different
tracing frontends than those with extensive runtime system supports. The trace-based
architecture of CRETE has enabled us to integrate such tracing frontends seamlessly.
We also introduced a set of optimizations that we have designed and implemented
to the prototype of CRETE to make it scale to analyze real-world user applications. We employ dynamic taint analysis to perform selective binary-level tracing,
from which the size of captured trace is reduced dramatically and makes binary-level
symbolic analysis feasible for practical applications. We also enforce concolic test
generation from symbolic analysis over the captured traces to reduce the redundancy
of generated test cases.
We evaluated our prototype of CRETE on GNU Coreutils programs, and compared with klee and angr, which are two state-of-art open-source symbolic executors for automated program analysis at source-level and binary-level. The evaluation
of Coreutils programs shows that CRETE achieved comparable code coverage as
klee directly analyzing the source code of Coreutils and generally outperformed
angr. CRETE also found 84 distinct and previously unreported crashes on widelyused and extensively-tested utility programs for UEFI BIOS development. Most of
crashes have been confirmed by the project maintainer and several patches have been
applied to fix them. We also make CRETE implementation publicly available to the
community at github.com/SVL-PSU/crete-dev.
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1.3

Automated Bug Detection and Replay for COTS Linux
Kernel Modules

1.3.1

Problem Statement

Linux kernel is widely used, e.g., 90 percent of the public cloud workloads were
running on Linux in 2017 [27]; in the first quarter of 2019, 75 percent of smartphones are equipped with Android which uses Linux as its core [101]; all of the top
500 supercomputers use Linux at the end of 2018 [79]. To support these diverse
computing environments, the size of the Linux kernel has been steadily growing,
reaching over 24.7 million LOC [27], and is continually changing to improve security,
performance or maintainability, as well as to support new devices, file systems, and
hardware architectures [70].
Linux kernel is typically split into two parts, e.g., the base kernel and Loadable
Kernel Modules (LKM) [93]. The base kernel provides essential services for user
applications and LKMs, such as process management, memory management, and
inner-process communication. Other functionalities are offloaded into separate LKMs,
such as supporting a new device or file system. The use of LKMs significantly improves
the extensibility and modularity of Linux kernel and reduces the memory usage of
Linux kernel, by allowing dynamic loading and unloading of LKMs on demand. The
security and reliability of LKMs are critical to the entire computer system, as they
are part of the trusted computing base of many systems [21]. Bugs and vulnerabilities
in LKMs can easily lead to the system crashes, and some can be further exploited by
adversaries with normal privilege to bypass kernel-enforced protections and gain root
privilege eventually. A study by Arnold et al. [3] argues that every kernel bug should
be treated as security-critical, and must be patched as soon as possible. As a result,
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systematic and thorough validation and testing for LKMs are highly desired.
Nevertheless, LKM validation (both functional and security) and debugging are
inherently difficult. First, LKMs are buried deeply inside the Linux kernel, interacting
only with hardware and base kernel directly. Isolating LKMs for runtime validation is
difficult and labor intensive. Testing LKMs through the kernel interface, e.g., system
calls, is also not effective, as different inputs issued to the kernel interface need to
cross multiple layers or modules to reach target LKM interfaces. Second, Linux kernel
employs a number of kernel threads, intensively interacting with hardware and userlevel applications, leading to high concurrency and non-determinism. It remains a
challenge to efficiently reproduce discovered kernel bugs. Furthermore, LKMs are
shipped by various vendors which may not have access to their source code, and
interactions between multiple LKMs are even harder to validate.
There has been many recent approaches to verifying and testing the Linux kernel
and LKMs [8, 9, 12, 26, 28, 40, 45, 51, 57, 65, 80, 92, 94, 119]. Static analysis is widely
used [8, 12, 80, 119], yet faces major challenges such as high false positive rates, not
capable to detect runtime defects, and not applicable to COTS LKMs. Symbolic or
concolic execution has been applied to Linux kernel and drivers [57, 65, 92]. However,
they either need to instrument and recompile the kernel [92], or does not produce
actionable test cases [65] which are essential for reproducing and debugging detected
kernel bugs. Recently, fuzzing has been trending in detecting security vulnerabilities
in OS kernels [9, 26, 28, 40, 45, 51, 94]. Most of the work [40, 45, 94] focus on fuzzing
through system call interfaces of Linux kernel which is often far away from the target
LKMs and cannot effectively analyze target LKM behaviors. Many of other works
are not applicable to COTS LKMs [9, 28]. In summary, existing approaches have two
major limitations: (1) lack of effective analysis over COTS LKMs by manipulating
LKM interfaces directly; (2) lack of infrastructures to generate and replay test cases
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that can steadily reproduce detected kernel vulnerabilities, under the kernel nondeterminism.
1.3.2

Solution Overview

We propose a novel approach to thoroughly testing COTS LKMs and steadily
reproducing discovered bugs. Our approach includes two major techniques: (1) automated test case generation from LKM interfaces with concolic execution; (2) automated test case replay that repeatedly reproduces detected bugs. Our approach
starts with a concrete execution of target LKMs triggered by a test harness that is a
sequence of user-level application commands. Along with this concrete execution, we
inject symbolic values to the LKM interface and perform concolic execution to exercise different paths of target LKMs and generate test cases for each explored path. A
generated test case is a sequence of LKM interface invocations that contains inputs
or outputs values of LKM entry functions and kernel APIs invoked from target LKM.
To minimize the non-determinism of the sequence of LKM interface invocations under
the same test harness, for test case generation and replay, we exclude LKM interface
invocations if the kernel is handling interrupts, and only include LKM invocations
triggered by non-concurrent user-level commands from the test harness. Together
with the capability of detecting and tolerating inconsistencies of LKM invocations
while test case replay, we achieve high replayable rate of generated test cases, and
enable automated reproduction of detected bugs.
We have implemented a prototype of our approach in COD, based on an opensource concolic engine CRETE [20]. Together with kernel dynamic instrumentation
Kprobe [61], COD automatically generates compact sets of test cases from COTS
LKMs, proactively checks for common kernel bugs with embedded checkers, and provides facility to repeatedly replay detected vulnerabilities with actionable test cases.
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We have evaluated COD on over 20 LKMs which cover major modules from the network and sound subsystems of Linux kernel. The results show that our approach can
effectively identify various kinds of kernel bugs, and reports 5 previously unreported
vulnerabilities including an unknown flaw that allows non-privileged user to trigger
kernel panic. By leveraging COD’s test case replay capability, we were able to fix
all the detected flaws in a short time without any domain knowledge, and patched
all these bugs in the Linux kernel upstream, including 3 patches were selected to
the stable release of Linux kernel and back-ported to numerous production kernel
versions.

1.4
1.4.1

Hardware/Software Co-validation of Systems-on-Chips
Problem Statement

Systems-on-Chips (SoC) are pervasive ranging from wearable devices to smart
phones, autonomous vehicles, and cloud servers. They are ubiquitous in every aspect
of our life. Such pervasiveness demands that SoC must be highly secure and robust;
otherwise, the consequences can be dire, from loss of confidential information to
endangerment of lives [89]. Meanwhile, SoC development cycles have been greatly
compressed. A new generation of SoC is often released with new hardware yearly if
not more frequently, while its software is updated regularly after the initial release.
Effective and efficient validations are highly desired for assuring SoC quality, given
such high time-to-market pressure.
In today’s practices, different components of SoC are validated separately. Hardware validation typically relies on simulation and formal methods [22, 47, 52]. The
software shipped with a SoC, including firmware (FW), device driver and user applications, is often validated through manual code review, static analysis [80, 98], and
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testing [29, 73–75]. System-level validation [90], i.e., validating the entire SoC system
by validating all components on the SoC chip and their interactions, are often missing.
Furthermore, system-level SoC validation is challenging. First, different components
of SoC are validated with different tools and methods due to their semantic differences. It is challenging to have a unified framework that carries out validation across
the entire SoC stack. Second, it is challenging to develop system-level test cases
which can simultaneously exercise multiple components on the SoC stack effectively.
Third, there lacks of interfaces to easily insert user-defined assertions [112] to validate
properties that cover the logic and requirements across multiple components of the
SoC.
1.4.2

Solution Overview

In this work, we propose an approach to end-to-end concolic testing for HW/SW
co-validation of SoC. Based on the simulation of SoC with multiple virtual platforms
(VPs), our framework captures run-time execution traces hierarchically across the
entire SoC stack. We assemble the captured traces from different components of the
SoC stack into a single holistic system-level trace, representing a concrete usage of the
entire SoC. We also provide an instrumentation interface for custom validation and
analysis over the system-level trace, where users can insert assertions checking properties crosscutting the SoC stack and introduce symbolic values at various HW/SW
interfaces. The instrumented trace is replayed in a concolic/symbolic engine to generate new system-level test cases that either explore new paths of the SoC stack or
trigger assertions. Assertion violations often indicate logic bugs. We implemented our
framework with qemu [11] as the host VP and Emu8051 [59] as IP Core VP. We evaluated our prototype by validating a key SoC hardware component, Intel E1000 [49]
Ethernet adapter, with its host software stack and IP firmware. The experiments
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demonstrate that our approach generates effective system-level test cases, and catch
various bugs with user-defined assertions, including two bugs from the E1000 virtual
device (VD) in qemu.

1.5

Dissertation Outline

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides
background on symbolic execution, concolic testing, the klee engine and the qemu
platform.

Chapter 3 presents the design, optimizations, and implementation of

CRETE, the infrastructure of versatile binary-level concolic testing. Chapter 4 elaborates how we apply versatile binary-level concolic testing to automatically detect
and replay kernel bugs. Chapter 5 illustrates how we leverage versatile binary-level
concolic testing for hardware/software co-validation of SoC. Chapter 6 concludes and
discusses future work.
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2

2.1

Background

Symbolic Execution and the KLEE Engine

Symbolic execution [10] is a program analysis technique that takes symbolic inputs, maintains different execution states and constraints of each path in a program,
and utilizes scheduling heuristics [18] to effectively explore the execution tree of the
target program. An execution state from the symbolic exertion of a program includes
a statement counter, values of variables and a path condition. Since the inputs are
symbolic, the values of variables are expressions over symbolic inputs, and the path
condition is a Boolean expression over symbolic inputs. Figure 2.1 illustrates an example of symbolic execution. At the entry of function bad_abs, input x is assigned with
symbolic value α, which allows all valid values of integer type. For each conditional
branch related to symbolic inputs, if both paths are feasible, a new execution state
will be forked from the current execution state. By updating path condition based
on the branch condition, both paths of the conditional branch can be covered and
explored. For this example, symbolic execution forks states twice for two conditional
branches, covering three paths in the function.
klee [15] is a state-of-the-art symbolic execution engine which is open-soured on
Github and actively maintained [106]. It performs source-level symbolic executions
for C programs, generates high-coverage test cases, and detects various kinds of bugs.
Essentially, klee is a multi-path program interpreter over llvm [68] bit-code with a
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1

int bad_abs ( int x )

2

{

3
4

return -x ;

5

True

if ( x == 1234)

6

False
α ≥0

x < 0?

α <0

return -x ;

7
8

x=α

if ( x < 0)

return -x

return x ;

True

x=
1234?

α = 1234

}

return -x
(a)

False
α ≠ 1234
return x

(b)

Figure 2.1: A simple function bad abs in C with its symbolic execution tree: (a)
Function bad abs in C. (b) Symbolic execution tree of bad abs with symbolic value
α assigned to input variable x.
set of checkers for detecting common bugs (buffer overflow, div by 0, etc.). It requires
users to compile their target C program into llvm bit-code, and specify symbolic
values through klee intrinsic. In our work, klee is leveraged to build prototypes of
the approaches we proposed.

2.2

Concolic Testing

Figure 2.2: Concolic testing workflow.
Concolic Execution [54, 97] combines concrete and symbolic execution. It leverages a concrete execution path to guide symbolic execution to achieve better scal-
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ability [16]. It has advantages over concrete execution since it only explores each
execution path once based on path constraints, while it is more scalable than symbolic execution because it leverage information from concrete execution to augment
symbolic execution. Figure 2.2 illustrates the basic workflow of concolic testing.
Given an initial test case, the software program under test is concretely executed.
During the concrete execution, a trace of the concrete execution is captured, which
mainly contains path constraints of the exercised path. By using an off-line constraint
solver, each branch condition from the captured trace is negated to generate a new
test case, aiming at covering new paths of the program under test. Newly generated
test cases are fed back into the concrete execution. This process repeats until all
paths of the program have been explored or a user specified condition is satisfied.

2.3

The QEMU Platform

qemu [11] is a virtual machine that provides full-system emulation of a computing
system. It supports to emulate different processor architectures, such as x86, SPARC,
and ARM, and allows to run unmodified software stack on its emulated systems,
denoted as the guest system. qemu provides two modes, namely KVM mode and
dynamic-binary-translation (DBT) mode. In KVM mode, qemu leverages hardware
virtualization features, e.g., Intel VT-x [50], to emulate guest execution with minimal
overhead. In this mode, the guest OS architecture is required to be the same as
the system architecture where qemu is running on, denoted as the host system.
In the DBT mode, the guest system architecture can be different from the host
system. To support different guest systems, qemu provides different DBT frontends
which disassemble instructions of various guest systems to a unified intermediate
representation, namely qemu-ir. It also provides different DBT backends to translate
qemu-ir to instructions runnable on the host system. The qemu-ir interpreter is a
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special DBT backend, which aims to make qemu host agnostic. In our work, we
mainly leverage the DBT mode of qemu with IR interpreter backend.
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3

The Infrastructure of Versatile Binary-level Concolic
Testing

In this chapter, we present CRETE, the infrastructure of versatile binary-level
concolic testing. It features an open and highly extensible architecture allowing easy
integration of concrete execution frontends and symbolic execution engine backends.
CRETE’s extensibility is rooted in its modular design where concrete and symbolic
execution is loosely coupled only through standardized execution traces and test cases.
The standardized execution traces are llvm-based, self-contained, and composable,
providing succinct and sufficient information for symbolic execution engines to reproduce the concrete executions. We have implemented CRETE with klee as the
symbolic execution engine and multiple concrete execution frontends such as qemu
and 8051 Emulator. We have evaluated the effectiveness of CRETE on GNU Coreutils programs and TianoCore utility programs for UEFI BIOS. The evaluation
of Coreutils programs shows that CRETE achieved comparable code coverage as
klee directly analyzing the source code of Coreutils and generally outperformed
angr. The evaluation of TianoCore utility programs found numerous exploitable
bugs that were previously unreported.
In summary, the CRETE framework makes several key contributions:
• Versatile concolic testing. CRETE provides an open and highly extensible
architecture allowing easy integration of different concrete and symbolic exe-

17
cution environments, which communicate with each other only by exchanging
standardized traces and test cases. This significantly improves applicability
and flexibility of concolic execution to modern platforms and is amenable to
leveraging new advancements in symbolic execution.
• Standardizing runtime traces. CRETE defines a standard binary-level trace
format, which is llvm based, self-contained and composable. Such a trace is
captured during concrete execution, representing an execution path of a sut. It
contains succinct and sufficient information for reproducing the execution path
in other program analysis environment, such as for symbolic execution. Having
standardized traces minimizes the need of converting traces for different analysis
environment and provides a basis for common trace-related optimizations.
• Implemented a CRETE prototype. We have implemented CRETE with
klee as the see backend and multiple concrete execution frontends such as
qemu and 8051 Emulator. CRETE achieved comparable code coverage on
Coreutils binaries as klee directly analyzing at source-level and generally
outperformed angr. CRETE also found 84 distinct and previously unreported
crashes on widely-used and extensively-tested utility programs for UEFI BIOS
development. We also make CRETE implementation publicly available to the
community at github.com/SVL-PSU/crete-dev.

3.1

Overview

During the design of the CRETE framework for binary-level concolic testing, we
have identified the following design goals:
• Binary-level In-vivo Analysis. It should require only the binary of the sut
and perform analysis in its real execution environment.
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• Extensibility. It should allow easy integration of concrete execution frontends
and see backends.
• High Coverage. It should achieve coverage that is not significantly lower than
the coverage attainable by source-level analysis.
• Minimal Changes to Existing Testing Processes. It should simply provide
additional test cases that can be plugged into existing testing processes without
major changes to the testing processes.
To achieve the goals above, we adopt an online/offline approach to concolic testing
in the design of the CRETE framework:
• Online Tracing. As the sut is concretely executed in a virtual or physical
machine, an online tracing plugin captures the binary-level execution trace into
a trace file.
• Offline Test Generation. An offline see takes the trace as input, injects
symbolic values and generates test cases. The new test cases are in turn applied
to the sut in the concrete execution.
This online tracing and offline test generation process is iterative: it repeats until all
generated test cases are issued or time bounds are reached. We extend this process
to satisfy our design goals as follows.
• Execution traces of a sut are captured in its unmodified execution environment
on binary-level. The tracing plugin can be an extension into a vm (Sec. 3.2.1),
a hardware tracing facility, or a dynamic binary instrumentation tool, such as
PIN [78], and DynamoRIO [13].
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Figure 3.1: CRETE architecture.
• The concrete and symbolic execution environments are decoupled by standardized traces (Sec. 3.2.2). As long as they can generate and consume standardized
traces, they can work together as a cohesive concolic process.
• Optimization can be explored on both tracing and test case generation, for
example, selective binary-level tracing to improve scalability (Sec. 3.2.3), and
concolic test generation to reduce test case redundancy (Sec. 3.2.4). This makes
high-coverage test generation on binary-level possible.
• The tracing plugin is transparent to existing testing processes, as it only collects
information. Therefore, no change is made to the testing processes.

3.2

Design

In this section, we present the design of CRETE with a vm as the concrete execution environment. The reason for selecting a vm is that it allows complete access
to the whole system for tracing runtime execution states and is generally accessible
as mature open-source projects.
3.2.1

CRETE Architecture

As shown in Fig. 3.1, CRETE has four key components: CRETE Runner, a tiny
helper program executing in the guest OS of the vm, which parses the configuration
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file and launches the target binary program (tbp) with the configuration and test
cases; CRETE Tracer, a comprehensive tracing plug-in in the vm, which captures
binary-level traces from the concrete execution of the tbp in the vm; CRETE Replayer, an extension of the see, which enables the see to perform concolic execution
on the captured traces and to generate test cases; CRETE Manager, a coordinator
that integrates the vm and see, which manages runtime traces captured and test
cases generated, coordinates the concrete and symbolic execution in the vm and the
see, and iteratively explores the tbp.
CRETE takes a tbp and a configuration file as inputs, and outputs generated test
cases along with a report of detected bugs. The manual effort and learning curve to
utilize CRETE are minimal. It makes virtually no difference for users to setup the
testing environment for the tbp in a CRETE instrumented vm than a vanilla vm.
The configuration file is an interface for users to configure parameters on testing a
tbp, especially specifying the number and size of symbolic command-line inputs and
symbolic files for test case generation.

① test case

Trace Pool

④ trace

⑥ test cases
③ trace

Guest OS
Executable
CRETE Runner

Virtual Machine
CRETE Tracer

② trace

Symbolic Execution
Engine

CRETE
Manager

⑦ test case

CRETE Replayer

⑧ test case

Test Pool

Figure 3.2: CRETE workflow.

⑤ trace
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The workflow of CRETE is shown in Figure 3.2. CRETE works in iterations and
each iteration includes the following phases:
• Binary Execution Phase: CRETE Runner first loads the input binary and
a test case into the guest OS. Then CRETE Runner executes the binary with
the data defined in the test case as inputs. In this way, the binary is executed
within vm in its native, unmodified guest OS environment.
• Trace Capture Phase: Along with the execution of the target program,
CRETE Tracer captures the runtime information needed to constitute a runtime
trace for symbolic analysis.
• Trace Selection Phase: CRETE Manager takes the captured trace as input
and maintains a pool of traces. CRETE Manager then selects a trace from this
pool and passes it to CRETE Replayer.
• Offline Replaying Phase: CRETE Replayer, in turn, invokes the see to
execute the selected trace symbolically. The see performs concolic test case
generation.
• Test Selection Phase: CRETE Manager receives newly generated test cases
from the see and maintains a test case pool. CRETE Manager then selects
one test case from the pool and sends it back to CRETE Runner to start the
next iteration of CRETE. This workflow iterates until no more test cases can
be generated or user-specified time bounds are reached.
3.2.2

Standardized Runtime Trace

To enable the modular and plug-and-play design of CRETE, a standardized
binary-level runtime trace format is needed. A trace in this format must capture
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sufficient information from the concrete execution, so the trace can be faithfully replayed within the see. In order to integrate a concrete execution environment to
the CRETE framework, only a plug-in for the environment needs to be developed, so
that the concrete execution trace can be stored in the standard file format. Similarly,
in order to integrate a see into CRETE, the engine only needs to be adapted to
consume trace files in that format.
We define the standardized runtime trace format based on the llvm assembly
language [69]. The reasons for selecting the llvm instruction sets are: (1) it has
become a de-facto standard for compiler design and program analysis [67, 68]; (2)
there have been many program analysis tools based on llvm assembly language [15,
32, 35, 42]. A standardized binary-level runtime trace is packed as a self-contained
llvm module that is directly consumable by a llvm interpreter. It is composed of
(1) a set of assembly-level basic blocks in the format of llvm functions (2) a set of
hardware states in the format of llvm global variables (3) a set of CRETE-defined
helper functions in llvm assembly (4) a main function in llvm assembly. The set of
assembly-level basic blocks is captured from a concrete execution of a program. It is
normally translated from another format (such as qemu-ir) into llvm assembly, and
each basic block is packed as a llvm function. The set of hardware states are runtime
states along the execution of the tbp. It consists of CPU states, memory states
and maybe states of other hardware components, which are packed as llvm global
variables. The set of helper functions are provided by CRETE to correlate captured
hardware states with captured basic blocks, and open interface to see. The main
function represents a concrete execution path of a program. It contains a sequence of
calls to captured basic blocks (llvm functions), and calls to CRETE-defined helper
functions with appropriate hardware states (llvm global variables).
An example of a standardized runtime trace of CRETE is listed in Fig. 3.3. The
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Concrete Execution Path

Initial HW State
CPU

@side_effects = {<r1>,<[0x5678]>}

r0,r1,...,rn
1

mem_ld r1, [0x1234]

2

add r1, r0

3
4

mem_st [0x1234], r1
Br r1, inst_5, xxx

5

mem_ld r1, [0x5678]

6

add r1, r0

7

mem_st [0x5678], r1

8

Jump inst_9

9

mem_ld r0, [0x1234]

[0x1234]
BB_1

r1
BB_2

10 add r1, r0

13 nop
14 nop

r1

[0x1234]
BB_3

11 mem_st [0x5678], r1
12 Br r0, xxx, inst_13
BB_4

Standardized Trace as a LLVM Module
Memory @init_state = {<r0,r1,...,rn>, <[0x1234]>}

HW Side Effects

Memory CPU

define asm_BB_1() {
%1 = load * 0x1234
%2 = getelementptr @init_state, r0_offset
%3 = load * %2
%4 = add %1, %3
%5 = getelementptr @init_state, r1_offset
store %4, * %5
store %4, * 0x1234
br %4, %.path_true, %.path_false
[0x5678] %.path_true:
%.path_false:
} ;asm_BB_3() is omitted
external aync_state() ;crete helper function
define main() {
call sync_state(@init_state)
call asm_BB_1()
call sync_state(@side_effects)
call asm_BB_3()
}

Figure 3.3: Example of standardized runtime trace.
first column of this figure is a complete execution path of a program with given
concrete inputs. It is in the format of assembly-level pseudo-code. Assuming the
basic blocks BB 1 and BB 3 are of interest and are captured by CRETE Tracer, while
other basic blocks are not (see Sec. 3.2.3 for details). As shown in the second and third
column of the figure, hardware states are captured in two categories, initial state and
side-effects from basic blocks not being captured. As shown in the fourth column of
the figure, captured basic blocks are packed as llvm functions, and captured hardware
states are packed as llvm global variables in the standardized trace. A main function
is also added making the trace a self-contained llvm module. The main function first
invokes CRETE helper functions to initialize hardware states, then it calls into the
first basic block llvm function. Before it calls into the second basic block llvm
function, the main function invokes CRETE helper functions to update hardware
states. For example, before calling asm BB 3, it calls function sync state to update
register r1 and memory location 0x5678, which are the side effects brought by BB 2.
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3.2.3

Selective Binary-level Tracing

A major part of a standardized trace is assembly-level basic blocks which are
essentially binary-level instruction sequences representing a concrete execution of a
tbp. It is challenging and unnecessary to capture the complete execution of a tbp.
First, software binaries can be very complex. If we capture the complete execution,
the trace file can be prohibitively large and difficult for the see to consume and
analyze. Second, as the tbp is executing, it is very common to invoke many runtime
libraries (such as libc) of no interest to the testers. Therefore, an automated way of
selecting the code of interest is needed.
CRETE utilizes Dynamic Taint Analysis (DTA) [95] to achieve selective tracing.
The DTA algorithm is a part of CRETE Tracer. It tracks the propagation of tainted
inputs, normally specified by users, during the execution of a program. It works on
binary-level and in byte-wise granularity. By utilizing the DTA algorithm, CRETE
Tracer only captures basic blocks that operate on tainted values, while only captures
side-effects from other basic blocks. Assuming the tainted source is from memory
location 0x1234, storing the value of user’s input to the program, in the example
trace of Fig. 3.3. DTA captures basic block BB 1 and BB 3, because both of them
operates on tainted values, while other two basic blocks don’t touch tainted values
and are not captured by DTA.
CRETE Tracer captures the initial state of CPU by capturing a copy of the CPU
state before the first interested basic block is executed. The initial CPU state is
normally a set of register values. As shown in Fig. 3.3, the initial CPU state is
captured before instruction (1). Näively, the initial memory state can be captured
in the same way; however, the typical size of memory makes it impractical to dump
entirely. To minimize the trace size, CRETE Tracer only captures the parts of memory
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that are accessed by the captured read instructions, like instruction (1) and (9). The
memory being touched by the captured write instructions, like instruction (3) and
(11), can be ignored because the state of this part of the memory has been included in
the write instructions and has been captured. As a result, CRETE Tracer monitors
every memory read instruction that is of interest, capturing memory as needed on-thefly. In the example above, there are two memory read instructions. CRETE Tracer
monitors both of them, but only keeps the memory state taken from instruction (1)
as a part of the initial state of memory, because instruction (1) and (9) access the
same address.
The side effects of hardware states are captured by monitoring uncaptured write
instructions of hardware states. In the example in Fig. 3.3, instructions (5) and
(6) write CPU registers which cause side effects to the CPU state. CRETE Tracer
monitors those instructions and keeps the updated register values as part of the
runtime trace. As register r1 is updated twice by two instructions, only the last
update is kept in the runtime trace. Similarly, CRETE Tracer captures the side
effect of memory at address 0x5678 by monitoring instruction (7).
3.2.4

Concolic Test Case Generation

While a standardized trace is a self-contained llvm module and can be directly
executed by a llvm interpreter, it opens interfaces to see to inject symbolic values
for test case generation. Normally see injects symbolic values by making a variable
in source code symbolic. From source code level to machine code level, references
of variables by names have become memory accesses by addresses. For instance, a
reference of a concrete input variable of a program becomes an access of a piece
of memory that stores the state of that input variable. CRETE injects self-defined
helper function, crete make concolic, to the captured basic blocks while capturing
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trace. This helper function provides the address and size of the piece of memory for
injecting symbolic values, along with a name to offer better readability for test case
generation. By catching this helper function, see can introduce symbolic values at
the right time and right place.
A standardized trace in CRETE represents only a single path of a tbp as shown
in Fig. 3.4 (a). Test case generation on this trace with näive symbolic execution by
see won’t be effective, as it ignores the single path nature of the trace. As illustrated
in Fig. 3.4 (b), native symbolic replay of CRETE trace produces execution states and
test cases that are exponential to the number of branches within the trace. To get
most effective results, see should adopt concolic test generation, by only negating
encountered branch conditions from CRETE trace instead of forking states. As a
result, the see in CRETE normally maintains only one program state during the
offline test case generation with symbolic values. For a branch instruction from a
captured basic block, if both of the paths are feasible given the collected constraints
so far on the symbolic values, the see only keeps the program state of the path that
was taken by the original concrete execution in the vm by adding the corresponding
constraints of this branch instruction, while the state of the other path is killed after
generating a test case for that state. The test cases generated from the killed states
lead the tbp to a different execution path, as the last branch condition was negated.
As shown in Fig. 3.4 (c), the number of test cases generated from concolic replay of
CRETE trace is linear to the number of branches in that trace.
3.2.5

Bug and Runtime Vulnerability Detection

CRETE detects bugs and runtime vulnerabilities in two ways. First, all the native checks embedded in see are checked during the symbolic replay over the trace
captured from concrete execution. If there is a violation to a check, a bug report
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Figure 3.4: Execution tree of the example trace from Fig. 3.3: (a) for concrete execution, (b) for symbolic execution, and (c) for concolic execution.
is generated and associated with the test case that is used in the vm to generate
this trace. Second, since CRETE does not change the native testing process and
simply provides additional test cases that can be applied in the native process, all
the bugs and vulnerability checks that are used in the native process are effective in
detecting bugs and vulnerabilities that can be triggered by the CRETE generated
test cases. For instance, Valgrind [83] can be utilized to detect memory related bugs
and vulnerabilities along the paths explored by CRETE test cases.

3.3

Implementation

To demonstrate the practicality of CRETE, we have implemented its complete
workflow with qemu [11] as the frontend and klee [15] as the backend respectively.
And to demonstrate the extensibility of CRETE, we have also developed the tracing
plug-in for the 8051 emulator which readily replaces qemu.
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1

< crete >
<exec > ./ prog </ exec >

2

< args >

3
4

< arg index = " 1 " size = " 8 " concolic = " true " / >

5

< arg index = " 2 " value = " ./ data " concolic = " false " / >

6

</ args >

7

< files >
< file path = " ./ data " size = " 10 " concolic = " true " / >

8

</ files >

9

< stdin size = " 10 " value = " " concolic = " true " / >

10
11

</ crete >

Figure 3.5: Sample configuration file of CRETE Runner.

3.3.1

CRETE Runner

We implemented CRETE Runner as a simple executable in the guest OS. It reads
the configuration file, communicates the configuration to the CRETE Tracer, and
then launches the program under test with the parameter setup specified in the configuration file.
A sample configuration file is shown in Fig. 3.5. The configuration file is in XML
format [63]. The user specifies the target executable’s file path, and what input will
be treated as concolic which is also the taint source for DTA. In this example, lines
(4) and (5) specify that there will be two command line arguments to the program.
The first will be treated as concolic and the second will be treated as concrete, to
refer to a file on disk. Line (8) specifies that the file itself referred by the second
argument will be treated as concolic. Line (10) specifies that standard input will be
treated as concolic and its size will be ten. For concolic argument or stdin, when its
size is provided, its initial value is optional, and its default value is binary zero.
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3.3.2

CRETE Tracer for qemu

qemu uses dynamic-binary-translation to execute instructions of a guest platform
on the host machine. qemu divides its dynamic binary translation into two parts.
Its frontend translates different guest instructions into a unified format, qemu-ir,
while the backend translates qemu-ir to different host instructions. To give CRETE
the best potential of supporting various guest platforms supported by qemu, CRETE
Tracer captures the basic blocks in the format of qemu-ir. To convert captured basic
blocks into standardized trace format, we implemented a qemu-ir to llvm translator based on the x86-llvm translator of s2 e [24]. We offload this translation from
the runtime tracing as a separate offline process to reduce the runtime overhead of
CRETE Tracer. qemu maintains its own virtual states to emulate physical hardware
state of a guest platform. For example, it utilizes virtual memory state and virtual
CPU state to emulate states of physical memory and CPU. Those virtual states of
qemu are essentially source-level structs. CRETE Tracer captures hardware states by
monitoring the runtime values of those structs maintained by qemu. qemu emulates
the hardware operations by manipulating those virtual states through corresponding
helper functions defined in qemu. CRETE Tracer captures the side effects on those
virtual hardware states by monitoring the invocation of those helper functions. As
a result, the initial hardware states being captured are the runtime values of these
qemu structs, and the side effects being captured are the side effects on those structs
from the uncaptured instructions.
3.3.3

CRETE Manager

CRETE Manager CRETE manager coordinates online tracing within qemu
and offline test generation within klee. It interacts with qemu by accepting the
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captured traces from concrete execution and dispatches the newly selected test cases.
It interacts with klee by dispatching the selected traces and accepting the newly
generated test cases. As shown in Figure 3.2, CRETE manager maintains a pool
of captured traces and a pool of generated test cases. It makes trace and test case
selections from these two pools respectively.
3.3.4

CRETE Replayer for klee

klee takes as input the llvm modules compiled from C source code. As the
CRETE trace is a self-contained llvm module, CRETE Replayer mainly injects
symbolic values and achieves concolic test generation. To inject symbolic values,
CRETE Replayer provides a special function handler for CRETE interface function
crete make concolic. klee is an online symbolic executor natively, which forks
execution states on each feasible branches and explores all execution paths by maintaining multiple execution states simultaneously. To achieve concolic test generation,
CRETE Replayer extends klee to generate test cases only for feasible branches while
not forking states.
3.3.5

CRETE Tracer for 8051 Emulator

The 8051 emulator executes an 8051 binary directly by interpreting its instructions
sequentially. For each type of instruction, the emulator provides a helper function.
Interpreting an instruction entails calling this function to compute and change the
relevant registers and memory states. The tracing plug-in for the 8051 emulator extends the interpreter. When the interpreter executes an instruction, a llvm call to
its corresponding helper function is put in the runtime trace. The 8051 instructionprocessing helper functions are compiled into llvm and incorporated into the runtime
trace serving as the helper functions that map the captured instructions to the cap-
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tured runtime states. The initial runtime state is captured from the 8051 emulator
before the first instruction is executed. The resulting trace is of the same format as
that from qemu and is readily consumable by klee.

3.4

Experimental Results

In this section, we present the evaluation results of CRETE from its application to
GNU Coreutils [36] and TianoCore utility programs for UEFI BIOS [110]. Those
evaluations demonstrate that CRETE generates effective test cases that are as effective in achieving high code coverage as the state-of-the-art tools for automated test
case generation, and can detect serious deeply embedded bugs.
3.4.1

GNU Coreutils

Experiment Setup. GNU Coreutils is a package of utilities widely used in
Unix-like systems. The 87 programs from Coreutils (version 6.10) contain 20, 559
lines of code, 988 functions, 14, 450 branches according to lcov [84]. The program
size ranges from 18 to 1, 475 in lines, from 2 to 120 in functions, and from 6 to 1, 272 in
branches. It is an often used benchmark for evaluating automated program analysis
systems, including klee, MergePoint and others [6, 15, 114]. This is why we chose it
as the benchmark to compare with klee and angr.
CRETE and angr generates test cases from program binaries without debug
information, while klee requires program source code. To measure and compare the
effectiveness of test cases generated from different systems, we rerun those tests on
the binaries compiled with coverage flag and calculate the code coverage with lcov.
Note that we only calculate the coverage of the code in GNU Coreutils itself, and
do not compute code coverage of the library code.
We adopted the configuration parameters for those programs from klee’s experi-
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ment instructions

1

. As specified in the instructions, we ran klee on each program

for one hour with a memory limit of 1GB. We increased the memory limit to 8GB
for the experiment on angr, while using the same timeout of one hour. CRETE
utilizes a different timeout strategy, which is defined by no new instructions being
covered in a given time-bound. We set the timeout for CRETE as 15 minutes in this
experiment. This timeout strategy was also used by DASE [114] for its evaluation on
Coreutils. We conduct our experiments on an Intel Core i7-3770 3.40GHz CPU
desktop with 16GB memory running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04.5. We built klee from its
release v1.3.0 with llvm 3.4, which was released on November 30, 2016. We built
angr from its mainstream on Github at revision e7df250, which was committed on
October 11, 2017. CRETE uses Ubuntu 12.04.5 as the guest OS for its vm frontend
in our experiments.
Table 3.1: Comparison of Average and Median Coverage by klee, angr, and CRETE
on Coreutils
Line (%)

Function (%)

Branch (%)

Cov.
klee angr CRETE klee angr CRETE klee angr CRETE
Average. 70.48 66.79

74.32 78.54 79.05

Median. 88.09 81.62

86.60

100

83.00 58.23 54.26

63.18

100 79.31 70.59

77.57

100

Comparison with klee and angr. As shown in Table 3.1, our experiments demonstrate that CRETE achieves comparable test coverage to klee and generally outperforms angr. The major advantage of klee over CRETE is that it works on source
code with all semantics information available. When the program size is small, symbolic execution is capable of exploring all feasible paths with given resources, such as
time and memory. This is why klee can achieve great code coverage, such as line
1

http://klee.github.io/docs/coreutils-experiments/
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Table 3.2: Distribution Comparison of Coverage Achieved by klee, angr, and
CRETE on Coreutils
Line

Function

Branch

Cov.
klee angr CRETE klee angr CRETE klee angr CRETE
90-100%

40

24

33

65

60

65

15

16

19

80-90%

15

22

25

12

8

10

27

12

17

70-80%

13

14

10

3

7

5

14

16

25

60-70%

9

12

10

2

4

3

9

15

6

50-60%

5

7

4

1

4

1

8

11

9

40-50%

1

2

3

1

1

2

8

7

6

0-40%

4

6

2

3

3

1

6

10

5

coverage over 90%, on more programs than CRETE, as shown in Table 3.2. klee
requires to maintain execution states for all paths being explored at once. This limitation becomes bigger when size of program gets bigger. What’s more, klee analyzes
programs within its own virtual environment with simplified model of real execution
environment. Those models sometimes offer advantages to klee by reducing the
complexity of the tbp, while sometimes they lead to disadvantages by introducing
inaccurate environment. This is why CRETE gradually caught up in general as shown
in Table 3.2. Specifically, CRETE gets higher line coverage on 33 programs, lower
on 31 programs, and the same on other 23 programs. Figure 3.6 (a) shows the coverage differences of CRETE over klee on all 87 Coreutils programs. Note that our
coverage results for klee are different from klee’s paper. As discussed and reported
in previous works [6, 114], the coverage differences are mainly due to the major code
changes of klee, an architecture change from 32-bit to 64-bit, and whether manual
system call failures are introduced.
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Figure 3.6: Line coverage difference on Coreutils by CRETE over klee and angr:
positive values mean CRETE is better, and negative values mean CRETE is worse.
angr shares the same limitation as klee requiring to maintain multiple states and
provide models for execution environment, while it shares the disadvantage of CRETE
in having no access to semantics information. Moreover, angr provides models of
environment at machine level supporting various platforms, which is more challenging
compared with klee’s model. What’s more, we found and reported several crashes of
angr from this evaluation, which also affects the result of angr. This is why angr
performs worse than both klee and CRETE in this experiment. Figure 3.6 (b)
shows the coverage differences of CRETE over angr on all 87 Coreutils programs.
While CRETE outperformed angr on majority of the programs, there is one program
printf that angr achieved over 40% better line coverage than CRETE, as shown
in the left most column in Fig. 3.6 (b). We found the reason is printf uses many
string routines from libc to parse inputs and angr provides effective models for
those string routines. Similarly, klee works much better on printf than CRETE.
Coverage Improvement over Seed Test Case. Since CRETE is a concolic testing

Coverage (%)
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Figure 3.7: Coverage improvement over seed test case by CRETE on GNU Coreutils.
framework, it needs an initial seed test case to start the test of a tbp. The goal of this
experiment is to show that CRETE can significantly increase the coverage achieved
by the seed test case that the user provides. To demonstrate the effectiveness of
CRETE, we set the non-file argument, the content of the input file and the stdin to
zeros as the seed test case. Of course, well-crafted test cases from the users would be
more meaningful and effective to serve as the initial test cases. Figure 3.7 shows the
coverage improvement of each program. On average, the initial seed test case covers
17.61% of lines, 29.55% of functions, and 11.11% of branches. CRETE improves the
line coverage by 56.71%, function coverage by 53.44%, and branch coverage by 52.14%
respectively. The overall coverage improvement on all 87 Coreutils programs is
significant.
Bug Detection. In our experiment on Coreutils, CRETE was able to detect
all three bugs on mkdir, mkfifo, and mknod that were detected by klee. This
demonstrates that CRETE does not sacrifice bug detection capacity while working
directly on binaries without debug and high-level semantic information.
3.4.2

TianoCore Utilities

Experiment Setup. TianoCore utility programs are part of the open-source project
EDK2 [109], a cross-platform firmware development environment from Intel. It includes 16 command-line programs used to build BIOS images. The TianoCore utility
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programs we evaluated are from its mainstream on Github at revision 75ce7ef committed on April 19, 2017. According to lcov, the 16 TianoCore utility programs
contain 8, 086 lines of code, 209 functions, and 4, 404 branches. Note that we only
calculate the coverage of the code for TianoCore utility programs themselves, and do
not compute the coverage of libraries.
The configuration parameters we used on those utility programs are based on
our rough high-level understanding of these programs from their user manuals. We
assigned each program a long argument of 16 Bytes, and four short arguments of 2
Bytes, along with a file of 10 Kilobytes. We conduct our experiments on the same
platform with the same host and guest OS as we did for the Coreutils evaluation,
and set the timeout also as 15 minutes for each program.
High Coverage Test Generation From Scratch. For all the arguments and file
contents in the parameter configuration, we set their initial value as binary zeros
to serve as the seed test case of CRETE. Figure 3.8 shows that CRETE delivered
high code coverage, above 80% line coverage, on 9 out of 16 programs. On average,
the initial seed test case covers 14.56% of lines, 28.71% of functions, and 12.38%
of branches. CRETE improves the line coverage by 43.61%, function coverage by
41.63%, and branch coverage by 44.63% respectively. Some programs got lower coverage because of: (1) inadequate configuration parameters; (2) error handling code
triggered only by failed system calls; (3) symbolic indices for arrays and files not well
handled by CRETE.
Bug Detection. To further demonstrate CRETE’s capability in detecting deeply
embedded bugs, we performed a set of evaluations focusing on concolic file with
CRETE on TianoCore utility programs. From the build process of a tutorial image,
OvmfPkg, from EDK2, we extracted 509 invocations to TianoCore utility programs
and the corresponding intermediate files generated, among which 37 unique invoca-
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Figure 3.8: Coverage improvement over seed test case by CRETE on TianoCore
utilities.
tions cover 6 different programs. By taking parameter configurations from those 37
invocations and using their files as seed files, we ran CRETE with a timeout of 2
hours on each setup, in which only files are made symbolic.
Table 3.3: Classified Crashes Found by CRETE on Tianocore Utilities: 84 unique
crashes from 8 programs
Crash Type

Count Severity

Crashed Programs

Stack Corruption

1

High (Exploitable)

VfrCompile

Heap Error

6

High (Exploitable

GenFw

High (Exploitable)

EfiLdrImage,

Write Access Violation 23

GenFw,

EfiRom, GenFfs
Abort Signal

2

Read Access Violation 45

Medium (Signs of exploitable) GenFw
Low (May not exploitable)

GenSec, GenFw, Split,
GenCrc32, VfrCompile

Other Access Violation 7

Mixed

GenFw

Combining experiments on concolic arguments and concolic files, CRETE found
84 distinct crashes (by stack hash) from eight TianoCore utility programs. We used
a GDB extension [34] to classify the crashes, which is a popular way of classifying
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crashes for AFL users [2]. Table 3.3 shows that CRETE found various kinds of
crashes including many exploitable ones, such as stack corruption, heap error, and
write access violation. There are 8 crashes that are found with concolic arguments
while the other 76 crashes are found with concolic files. We reported all those crashes
to the TianoCore development team. So far, most of the crashes have been confirmed
as real bugs, and ten of them have been fixed.
We now elaborate on a few sample crashes to demonstrate that the bugs found
by CRETE are significant. VfrCompile crashed with a segmentation fault due to
stack corruption when the input file name is malformed, e.g., '\\.%*a' as generated by CRETE. This bug is essentially a format string exploit. VfrCompile uses
function vsprintf() to compose a new string from a format string and store it in
a local array with a fixed size. When the format string is malicious, like '%*a',
function vsprintf() will keep reading from the stack and the local buffer will be
overflowed, hence causing a stack corruption. Note that CRETE generated a wellformed prefix for the input, '\\.', which is required to pass the preprocessing check
from VfrCompile, so that the malicious format string can attack the vulnerable code.
CRETE also exposed several heap errors on GenFw by generating malformed input
files. GenFw is used to generate a firmware image from an input file. The input file
needs to follow a very precise file format, because GenFw checks the signature bytes to
decide the input file type, uses complex nested structs to parse different sections of the
file, and conducts many checks to ensure the input file is well-formed. Starting from a
seed file of 223 Kilobyte extracted from EDK2’s build process, CRETE automatically
mutated 29 bytes in the file header. The mutated bytes introduced a particular
combination of file signature and sizes and offsets of different sections of the file.
This combination passed all checks on file format, and directed GenFw to a vulnerable
function which mistakenly replaces the buffer already allocated for storing the input
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file with a much smaller buffer. Follow-up accesses of this malformed buffer caused
overflow and heap corruption.

3.5
3.5.1

Related Work
DART, CUTE, and SAGE

DART [38] and CUTE [97] are both early representative work on concolic testing.
They operate on the source code level. We further extend concolic testing and targets
close-source binary programs. We also modularize concolic testing by loosely coupling
concrete execution and symbolic execution only by standardized trace files based on
the llvm bitcode and test cases. SAGE [39] is a Microsoft internal concolic testing
tool that particularly targets at X86 binaries on Windows. We are trying to provide
a platform agnostic approach: as long as a trace from concrete execution can be
converted into the llvm-based trace format, it can be analyzed to generate test
cases.
3.5.2

KLEE and S2E

klee [15] is a source-code-level symbolic execution tool that is built on the llvm
infrastructure [68] and is capable of generating high-coverage test cases for C programs. klee analyzes the llvm bitcode compiled from the C sut, symbolically
explores the execution paths of the program, and generates a test case for each path
explored. CRETE adopts klee as its see, and extends it to perform concolic execution on standardized binary-level traces. In CRETE, the binary level run-time
execution trace is converted into the llvm bitcode format and sent to klee for analysis. The test cases that klee generates are converted into the test case file format
for the concrete execution environment.
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s2 e [25] provides a framework for developing tools for analyzing close-source software programs. It augments a Virtual Machine (vm) with a see and path analyzers.
It features a tight coupling of concrete and symbolic execution. The execution of a
sut can cross back and forth between concrete and symbolic execution. CRETE,
however, has taken a loosely coupled approach to the interaction of concrete and
symbolic execution. CRETE captures complete execution traces of the sut online
and conducts whole trace symbolic analysis off-line. CRETE reduces runtime overhead to the concrete execution, conducts global optimization over traces in symbolic
execution, and achieves modularity so that different virtual or physical machines and
symbolic engines can be plugged in the CRETE framework. CRETE brings better
scalability, applicability, and modularity.
3.5.3

BitBlaze, Mayhem, and MergePoint

BitBlaze [100] is an early representative work on binary analysis for computer
security. It provides TEMU, a qemu-based run-time analysis frontend, and VINE, a
symbolic execution backend. TEMU and VINE were closely integrated into Rudder,
a tool for symbolic execution of software binaries. BitBlaze, particularly Rudder,
focuses on effective detection of security vulnerabilities by leveraging the close coupling of TEMU and VINE. Mayhem [17] and MergePoint [6] build on BitBlaze and
further optimize the close coupling of their concrete execution frontend and symbolic analysis backend to improve their effectiveness in detecting exploitable software
bugs. CRETE has a different focus on providing an open architecture for binary-level
concolic testing that enables flexible integration of various concrete and symbolic execution environments and extends concolic testing to complex software systems that
may involve binaries executing on various hardware platforms.
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3.5.4

Angr

angr is an extensible Python framework for binary analysis using VEX [83] as
an intermediate representation (IR). It implemented a number of existing analysis
techniques and enabled the comparison of different techniques in a single platform.
angr provides CLE to load the binary under test in its own virtual environment,
and provides lifters to disassemble binary code into VEX IR, from where it conducts
symbolic execution over VEX IRs. As angr performs in-vitro binary analysis, it requires to model the real execution environment for the binary under test, like system
calls and common library functions. This is one of the biggest limitations of angr, because the environment model can never be complete nor accurate. CRETE, however,
performs in-vivo binary analysis, by analyzing binary-level trace captured from unmodified execution environment of target binary. On the other hand, angr needs to
maintain execution states for all paths being explored at once, while CRETE reduces
memory usage dramatically by analyzing a program path by path and separates symbolic execution from trace capturing. What’s more, CRETE produces llvm-based,
self-contained trace, which favors many program analysis tools.
3.5.5

Fuzzing Testing

Our work is also related to fuzz testing [37], a black or white box testing technique which tests software programs by inputting massive amounts of random data.
A popular representative tool for fuzzing is AFL [1]. Fuzzing is fast and quite effective for bug detection; however, it can easily get stuck when a specific input, like
magic number, is required to pass a check and explore new paths of a program.
Concolic testing guides the generation of test cases by solving constraints from the
source code or binary execution traces and is quite effective in generating complicated
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inputs. Therefore, fuzzing and concolic testing are complementary software testing
techniques.

3.6
3.6.1

Discussions
Parallelization for Scalability

The current workflow of CRETE does not exploit the potential of multiprocessing and parallelism, and exchanges data through slow socket communication across
different components, which provides major opportunities for future optimizations.
The modularity of CRETE enables parallelization. Since the concrete execution and
symbolic execution of CRETE are separated through trace files and test cases, they
can be executed in parallel, even on different machines. In addition, there can be
multiple instances of both concrete and symbolic execution. This enables CRETE to
leverage computing resources and scale to complex programs.
CRETE Manager manages those instances of concrete and symbolic execution. It
selects test cases from the test case pool and launches concrete execution in qemu,
and selects traces from the trace pool and launches symbolic execution in klee. As
new traces and test cases are generated, CRETE Manager also merges them into
the corresponding pools. Particularly, for the trace pool, the trace has to be merge
into the execution tree incrementally. Some traces may overlap with existing traces,
therefore, have to be removed.
3.6.2

Extensibility and Applicability

The design of CRETE frontend as a plug-in for the vm makes CRETE inherently
extensible to support programs running on different OS such as Linux and Windows
and hardware architectures such as x86 and ARM. Meanwhile, CRETE is a highly
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modular framework, which has great potential of being extended to support different
concrete and symbolic execution environments or engines.
In term of applicability, CRETE can work with programs from different system
levels, including user-level executables and libraries, kernel-level modules and drivers,
and programs running on bare metal hardware such as BIOS and firmware. Since
CRETE directly operates on binaries, it is applicable to programs written in different
programming languages, such as assembly, C and C++, and potentially Java.

3.7

Summary

In this chapter, we have presented CRETE, a versatile binary-level concolic testing
framework, which is designed to have an open and highly extensible architecture allowing easy integration of concrete execution frontends and symbolic execution backends.
At the core of this architecture is a standardized format for binary-level execution
traces, which is llvm-based, self-contained, and composable. Standardized execution
traces are captured by concrete execution frontends, providing succinct and sufficient
information for symbolic execution backends to reproduce the concrete executions.
We have implemented CRETE with klee as the symbolic execution engine and multiple concrete execution frontends such as qemu and 8051 Emulator. The evaluation
of Coreutils programs shows that CRETE achieved comparable code coverage as
klee directly analyzing the source code of Coreutils and generally outperformed
angr. The evaluation of TianoCore utility programs found numerous exploitable
bugs that were previously unreported.
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4

Automated Bug Detection and Replay for COTS Linux
Kernel Modules

Linux kernel is pervasive in the cloud, on mobile platforms, and on supercomputers. To support these diverse computing environments, the Linux kernel provides
extensibility and modularity through Loadable Kernel Modules (LKM), while featuring a monolithic architecture for execution efficiency. This architecture design brings
a major challenge to the security of Linux kernel. Having LKMs run in the same
memory space as the base kernel on Ring 0, a single flaw from LKMs may compromise the entire system, e.g., gaining root access. However, validation and debugging
of LKMs are inherently challenging, because of its special interface buried deeply in
the kernel, and non-determinism from interrupts. Also, LKMs are shipped by various
vendors and may not have access to their source code, making the validation even
harder.
In this chapter, we propose a framework for efficient bug detection and replay of
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Linux kernel modules based on concolic execution.
Our framework automatically generates compact sets of test cases for COTS LKMs,
proactively checks for common kernel bugs, and allows to reproduce reported bugs
repeatedly with actionable test cases. We evaluate our approach on over 20 LKMs
covering major modules from the network and sound subsystems of Linux kernel. The
results show that our approach can effectively detect various kernel bugs, and reports
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5 new vulnerabilities including an unknown flaw that allows non-privileged users to
trigger kernel panic. By leveraging the replay capability of our framework, we patched
all the reported bugs in the Linux kernel upstream, including 3 patches were selected
to the stable release of Linux kernel and back-ported to numerous production kernel
versions. We also compare our prototype with kAFL, the state-of-the-art kernel
fuzzer, and demonstrate the effectiveness of concolic execution over fuzzing on the
kernel level.
In summary, our approach makes three key contributions:
• We proposed an approach to automatically generating compact sets of test cases
for COTS LKMs. The generated test cases can thoroughly exercise the target
LKMs by manipulating LKM interfaces directly and precisely.
• We designed a system to automatically replay test cases of COTS LKMs and
proactively check for common kernel bugs, which allows to repeatedly reproduce
detected kernel vulnerabilities. We believe this system has major potential in
helping LKM debugging and patching.
• We implemented a prototype of our approach in COD, and evaluated it with over
20 COTS LKMs covering network and sound subsystems of Linux kernel. COD
discovered various kernel vulnerabilities, including null-pointer de-reference and
resource leak. By leveraging the replay facility of COD, we also patched all the
detected bugs in the Linux kernel upstream.

4.1

Background

In this section, we first introduce the interface of LKMs, and then we introduce
kernel dynamic instrumentation, an important techniques COD is based on.
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Figure 4.1: The interface of LKMs: (a) interactions between user application, base
kernel and LKMs, and (b) a concrete example based on ifconfig and e1000. The
interactions between hardware and LKMs are omitted.

4.1.1

Interfaces of LKMs

A program communicates and interacts with users or other programs through
interfaces. With different interface inputs, a program exhibits different behaviors and
exercises different paths. The purpose of test case generation is to produce a set of
interface inputs that covers as many program paths as possible. User applications
normally have clean interfaces, e.g., strings for command-line programs, and files for
editors.
LKMs have a more complex interface than user applications, because they are
buried in kernel and only works with the base kernel directly. As shown in the green
box of figure 4.1 (a), LKMs interacts with base kernel through entry functions and
kernel APIs, which are the LKM interfaces. Entry functions are defined in LKMs and
are exposed to base kernel as interfaces to fulfill requests from user applications, while
LKMs utilize kernel functionalities by calling kernel APIs. Different paths of LKMs
can be exercised with either different entry function calls with different arguments
from base kernel, or different side effects from kernel APIs, e.g., return values of
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kernel APIs, and data exchanged with pointer arguments passed to kernel APIs. For
example, Figure 4.1 (b) shows the interactions between LKM e100.ko and the base
kernel, triggered by the user application ifconfig. Note that LKMs also interact
directly with hardware, e.g., reading and writing hardware interface registers. It is
also a part of the LKM interface, but is omitted as it is not the focus of this work.
4.1.2

Kernel Dynamic Instrumentation

We leverage Kprobe [61], a debugging mechanism provided by Linux kernel, to
perform kernel dynamic instrumentation. Kprobe allows users to insert a set of handlers on a certain instruction address. By using Kprobe, we introduce concolic values
at the interface of LKMs for test case generation, replay generated test cases repeatedly, and collects run-time information for detecting kernel bugs.

4.2

Overview

In this section, we first present the high-level methodology of our approach. Then
we introduce the definition of test cases for LKMs. At last, we discuss how our
approach handles non-determinism and concurrency of the Linux kernel.
4.2.1

Methodology

While designing the COD framework for analyzing LKMs, we have identified the
following design goals:
• Binary-level In-vivo Analysis. It should be applicable to COTS LKMs, and
require no recompilation or modification to the rest of kernel stack.
• Effective Bug Detection. It should detect various types of kernel bugs with
minimal false alarms.

48
• Automated Bug Replay. It should enable developers to reproduce bugs
easily, which helps locate and fix the reported bugs.
• Multiple LKMs. It should be capable of analyzing multiple LKMs and their
interactions at the same time.
To achieve the goals above, we adopt and extend the versatile concolic testing
approach of CRETE in the design of the COD framework as follows.
• We introduce a kernel shim to intercept interactions between base kernel and
target LKMs, and use it along with a kernel hypercall interface to dynamically inject concolic values at LKM interfaces while capturing runtime traces
(Section 4.3.3). Also, we build COD tracer by augmenting CRETE tracer to
support multiple applications and kernel modules, through which we capture
run-time execution traces of target LKMs from unmodified guest OS stack (Section 4.3.4).
• We build COD Trace Replayer for symbolic analysis and test case generation
over the captured traces, by extending the CRETE trace replayer with trace
checkers and constraint editors for checking common kernel bugs and imposing constrains on generated test cases (Section 4.3.5).
• We provide COD TC Replayer, which allow users to replay generated test cases
repeatedly, out of test generation environment and on both virtual and physical
platforms (Section 4.4). It is embedded with kAPI checkers (Section 4.4.2)
to detect common kernel bugs and produce informative reports to boost bug
analysis.
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4.2.2

Test Cases for LKMs

The core of our approach is to generate effective test cases from LKM interfaces
for bug detection and replay. We now introduce the definition of the test case for
LKMs.
Let an LKM entry function or a kernel API be function f : α
~ → τ , where α
~ represents the inputs and τ represents the return of function f . An invocation of function
~ ti, where fi is one instance of the invocation of
f is denoted by a triple k , hfi , A,
~ contains the concrete values for the inputs, and t is the concrete return
function f , A
value. Note that we treat the invocations of f at different locations in the LKM as
different instances. A test case π , (k0 , k1 , · · · , kn ) is a sequence of entry function or
kernel API invocations.
Informally, when we run a test harness with multiple user commands, it triggers
a sequence of LKM entry functions or kernel APIs. A test case is defined as the
observed behavior on the interfaces, i.e. inputs and return values of LKM entry
functions and kernel APIs, upon running the test harness. COD distinguishes each
instance of function invocations with a TC Identifier that is composed of function
name, invocation site, LKM name, and index of user commands in the test harness.
4.2.3

Handling Kernel Non-determinism

Our approach involves tracing the execution of LKMs and replay of LKM test
cases, both of which face major challenges from kernel’s non-determinism. The major
cause of kernel’s non-determinism is from interrupts and the concurrency nature of
the kernel itself.
To handle this challenge, we first monitor the start and end of interrupts and
exclude the execution of interrupt handler from the tracing and test case generation
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Figure 4.2: The architecture of COD for automated test case generation.
process (details in Section 4.3.4). Second, we require the user-level test harness only
contains commands with no concurrency, and all commands are executed sequentially. Meanwhile, in test case generation and replay, we only include LKM interface
invocations from the test harness, while excluding other invocations from other process or interrupts. Third, in test case replay with the given test harness, we detect
and tolerate the inconsistencies of interface invocations from target LKMs (details in
Section 4.4).

4.3
4.3.1

Test Case Generation
Architecture and Workflow

As shown in figure 4.2, the COD architecture for test case generation is split into
two domains, VM guest OS and host OS. A user-land Agent and two custom kernel modules, kernel shim and kernel hypercall interface, together with target
LKMs and native OS stack are running within VM guest OS. A virtual machine augmented with COD Tracer, a symbolic engine augmented with COD Trace Replayer,
and a Manager are running on host machine.
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We now outline the events and communications that take place during the test
case generation process. When the manager is started, (1) it sends a message to Agent
through sockets, and (2) sends an initial test case to the VM. The message contains
a list of target LKMs, and a sequence of commands as test harness. (3) The Agent
loads two custom kernel modules, kernel shim and kernel hypercall interface,
and pass them the list of LKMs as parameters. (4) The Agent then executes the
commands of the test harness sequentially to trigger functionalities of target LKMs
through base kernel. (5) The custom kernel module kernel shim intercepts the
interactions between base kernel and target LKMs. (6) It also communicates with
the VM through the other module kernel hypercall interface, to add new tainted
values to the taint analysis engine in the VM, report kernel panics to the VM, and
retrieve values of test case from VM to modify the interactions between target LKMs
and base kernel if needed. (7) When all commands in the test harness are finished, the
COD Tracer captures the runtime execution trace into a file, and sends it to symbolic
engine through the manager over sockets. (8) The COD Trace Replayer performs
symbolic analysis over the captured trace, and sends the generated test cases back to
the VM. The iteration of test case generation repeats from step (4) to step (8), and
stops when user specified conditions are met, e.g., time limits.
4.3.2

COD Agent

The Agent is a user-mode application running in the VM guest OS, which receives
commands from the Manager and sets up the guest OS for test generation. The Agent
inserts the two custom kernel modules of COD along with the list of the target LKMs
as parameters, and launches the commands from test harness one by one. It also
monitors the crash and time-out of executed commands, and reports to VM when
needed. The Agent also passes user-level information to the kernel through system
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calls, including the PID and index of the running command.
4.3.3

Kernel Shim and Hypercall Interface

COD provides two custom kernel modules running in Ring 0 to inject concolic
values at the interface of target LKMs for capturing runtime traces. The module
kernel shim defines a set of Kprobe handlers to intercept interactions between base
kernel and LKMs, including calls to the entry functions of target LKMs from the base
kernel and calls to kernel APIs from target LKMs. It also takes as input a list of target
LKM names, and maintains the user-level information sent from the Agent, including
the PID and index of the running command from the test harness. Based the PID
and list of names, the Kprobe handlers modify the interactions between base kernel
and target LKMs only if they are triggered by the command from the test harness.
Each Kprobe handler defines where to inject concolic values to the current LKM entry
function or kernel API. The module hypercall interface defines interface functions
for VM guest kernel to communicate with the underline VM. An important interface
function is cod make concolic(), which is used to inform the VM to inject concolic
values to the VM guest memory. This function takes as inputs a TC Identifier,
the address and size of the piece of kernel memory in the VM guest for injecting
concolic values. The TC Identifier is generated by each Kprobe handlers based on
the information passed from the Agent. With the call to this function, the underline
VM first marks the given range of guest memory as tainted values which is used for
taint analysis and selective tracing, and then tries to retrieve values from a given
test case by matching the TC Identifier. When a match is found, the values from
test case overwrite the values in the given range of guest memory, modifying the
current LKM interface invocation. Another important hypercall interface function
is cod kernel oops, which reports the kernel panic to the VM for logging detected

53
issues and rapid restarting for the next iteration of runtime tracing. For example,
with these two custom kernel modules, COD introduces concolic values (and finally
generates test cases) to the kernel memory whose value is from copy from user(),
selected arguments of e1000 ioctl(), and return value of
4.3.4

kmalloc().

COD Tracer

The Tracer produces runtime traces of COTS LKMs. Like traces of CRETE, the
captured trace is a self-contained llvm [68] module with injected custom callbacks to
inject symbolic values for test generation in Trace Replayer. We extend the Tracer
of CRETE to capture COTS LKM runtime traces. CRETE is designed for userlevel binaries and is not applicable to LKMs. First, CRETE is limited in injecting
concolic values to the interface of user-level applications, e.g., command-line, file
and stdin which are all statically known before the execution of given applications.
COD extends the Tracer to support concolic values from LKM interfaces that are
dynamically added on-the-fly during the execution of given test harness. Second,
CRETE is designed to analyze a single application. COD extends the Tracer to
capture traces from a sequence of applications. The COD Tracer turns on capturing
when the PID is sent from the Agent, and turns off capturing when the process of
the given PID exits. Also, COD extends the DTA engine in the Tracer to track the
propagation of tainted values in the kernel across different processes, instead of only
tracking a single process. As the design of the split virtual memory layout used
in common x86 OS, Linux kernel is mapped to virtual address space of all processes,
and is located always at the same virtual address. We pass the tainted memory in
the virtual address of the kernel in the previous target process to the coming target
process, and use it as the initial tainted values to start taint analysis. Third, COD
added an interrupt monitor to the Tracer. COD intercepts the procedure of CPU
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transition from normal execution to interrupt handler in the VM, which covers both
the synchronous interrupts raised from software, e.g., interrupt from a page fault,
and the asynchronous interrupts raised from hardware, e.g., interrupt from network
card. At the same time, the COD Tracer interleaves the procedure of handling iret
instruction in the VM to detect the end of interrupts. By maintaining a call stack
structure of interrupt starts and ends, the Tracer handles nested interrupts. When
the CPU is executing code of interrupt handlers, the Tracer turns off tracing and
ignores hypercalls of cod make concolic(). This alleviates the non-determinism of
the kernel for tracing and test case generation.
4.3.5

COD Trace Replayer

The Trace Replayer introduces symbolic values to the captured trace based on
the callbacks embedded in the trace, replays the trace symbolically, and generates
test cases by negating constraints of the branches encountered. We extend the Trace
Replayer of CRETE with a Constraint Editor and a Trace Checker to generate
more compact set of test cases, and detect more bugs with lower false alarm rates for
LKMs. The Constraint Editor defines a set of rules to add predefined constraints to
the symbolic values while they are introduced to the captured trace. These rules are
to refine the symbolic values related to the kernel APIs and impose valid constraints
to the test case generated. For example, the symbolic value of pci enable device’s
return is restricted to be in range [−128, 0], which respects that this function returns
0 on success, returns negative on failure and never return positive values; the symbolic
value of

kmalloc’s return is restricted to be 0 (null), which respects that memory

allocation functions either return 0 on failure or return non-zero on success. These
rules are crucial to produce compact sets of test cases and reduce false alarms from
generating test cases with invalid values of kernel APIs. What’s more, the KAPI
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Figure 4.3: The architecture of COD for automated test case replay.
Checkers define a set of custom assertions to proactively check common bugs of
LKMs. If an assertion failed, a test case is generated for users to reproduce the
same assertion failure later, and the bug is reported to the Manager for logging. One
example assertion is “ kmalloc() != 0”. During the symbolic replay of captured
traces, this assertion is checked for every memory operation (both read and write)
whose operand address is composed of the return from

4.4
4.4.1

kmalloc().

Test Case Replay
Architecture and Workflow

COD allows user to reproduce generated test cases repeatedly on both physical
and virtual machines, and generates crash log to assist developers to debug and
fix reported bugs. As shown in Figure 4.3, the architecture of test case replay in
COD is composed of a user-mode program TC Replayer with an extensible plugin
kAPI Checker, and three custom kernel modules, namely Kernel Shim, TC Element
Supplier, and kAPI Tracer.
We now illustrate the workflow of this design. (1) The TC Replayer is started by
users with inputs of a set of test cases and a configuration file. The configuration file
contains a list of target LKMs, and a sequence of commands as the test harness. Then
the TC Replayer (2) loads the three custom kernel modules and passes them the list
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of target LKMs as parameters, (3) picks one test case and pass it to the custom kernel
module TC Element Supplier, and (4) executes the commands in the test harness
sequentially to trigger functionalities of target LKMs. (5) The custom kernel module
Kernel Shim intercepts the interactions between base kernel and target LKMs. (6)
The callbacks in Kernel Shim either call into TC Element Supplier to modify the
interactions between kernel and target LKMs, or call into kAPI Tracer to capture
kernel API usage information. When all commands in the test harness are executed,
the TC Replayer (7) retrieves the kernel API usage information from the custom
kernel module kAPI Tracer, and (8) checks for potential bugs with kAPI Checker.
The loop repeats from (3) to (8) for all input test cases.
4.4.2

COD TC Replayer and kAPI Checker

The TC Replayer is a user-mode application that takes user inputs, and manages
the test case replay loop. It leverages Kdump [41] to collect system log and kernel
dump image when kernel fails, such as kernel panic, oops or hang. TC Replayer
also automatically retries on the same kernel failure, and reports to users only kernel
failures that can be consistently reproduced. At the end, it outputs a set of detected
bugs along with the corresponding test cases, system logs, and kernel dump images.
Additionally, like the COD Agent, the TC Replayer passes user-level information, including PID and index of the running command from the test harness, to the kernel
to assist the test case replay. The TC Replayer is also embedded with kAPI Checker
which contains a set of assertions to check common bugs related to kernel API usages,
e.g., detecting resource leak with paired function [77].
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4.4.3

Custom Kernel Modules

The custom kernel module Kernel Shim is reused from the COD’s design of test
case generation, and is extended with KS-new which contains additional set of Kprobes
on kernel API functions. With the Kprobes, function invocations of target LKMs are
intercepted. TC Element Supplier provides a set of interface functions with the same
signature as its counterpart in test case generation Kernel Hypercall Interface
which is used by Kprobe handlers. But it is used to replay test case instead of
communicating with VM to inject concolic values. In TC Element Supplier, the
interface function cod make concolic() still takes as inputs a TC Identifier, the
address and size of a piece of kernel memory. With the input TC Identifier, this
function checks whether the current LKM function invocation matches the one from
the test case under replay. If matched, the current invocation is modified with the
corresponding values of function inputs or outputs from the test case, replaying the
matched invocation from the test case. Otherwise, a mismatch of the test case replay
is detected, indicating non-determinism occurs, which stops the replay of the test case
for the current running command and resumes on the next command. The custom
kernel module kAPI Tracer is used by the Kprobes defined in KS-new. It captures
runtime information of the probed kernel APIs, including kernel API name, input
values, return values, target LKM name and call site information that is the offset
from the .text section of target LKM.
4.4.4

Measurement of Test Case Replay

In general, a test harness triggers a sequence of LKM function invocations that
are intercepted by Kernel Shim. This in turn triggers a sequence of calls to function cod make concolic() in TC Element Supplier, and generates a sequence of TC
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Identifier representing the sequence of LKM function invocations from the current
execution of the test harness. We measure the replayable rate of a test case by measuring the similarity score of the new TC Identifier sequence and TC Identifier
sequence from the test case under replay. We define the similarity score of two sequences as follows.
Definition 1 Sequence Similarity Score: Let p and q be two sequences, and let
lcp(p, q) be the longest common prefix of p and q. The similarity score of p and q is
defined as ξ(p, q) =

|lpc(p,q)|
.
max(|p|,|q|)

For example, if p = abcd, and q = abcex, the longest common prefix of p and q
is abc, so the similarity score of ξ(p, q) is 60%(3/5).
Since the new TC Identifier sequence, denoted as π1 , is triggered by x commands in the test harness, we can further partition π1 into sub-sequences based on
which command triggered which sub-sequence, denoted as
c1

c1

1

c
z }|0 { z }|1 {
z }|x {
0
), (k01 , · · · , kn1 ), · · · , (k0x , · · · , kpx )),
π1 , ((k00 , · · · , km

or π1 , (c10 , c11 , c1x ) in short. Similarly, the TC Identifier sequence from the test
case under replay is denoted as π2 , (c20 , c21 , c2x ). Since π1 and π2 are sequences of
sub-sequences, we measure the similarity of π1 and π2 as ξ(π1 , π2 ) =

4.5

Px
|lcp(c1i ,c2i )|
Pxi=0
1 |,|c2 |) .
max(|c
i=0
i
i

Implementation

We built a prototype of COD based on CRETE [20]. We extended its frontend, the
VM qemu [11], with 1.1k LOC for supporting concolic interface of LKMs, tracing multiple processes, and monitoring interrupts. We also extended CRETE backend, the
symbolic engine klee [15], with 0.7k LOC code for supporting Constraint Editor
and Trace Checker. We wrote a set of custom kernel modules based on Linux kernel
v3.13 (default kernel for Ubuntu 14.04) and v4.4 (default kernel for Ubuntu 16.04).
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There are roughly 2.2k LOC, which defines 154 Kprobes [61] for test case generation,
and another over 78 Kprobes for tracing kernel API usage during test case replay. We
also wrote a set of checkers for 113 pairs of kernel API detecting resource leak bugs,
and a checker for detecting redundant usage of netif napi del, which is a common
problem in network drivers we learned from existing patches. The TC Replayer has
1.5k LOC code. It supports replaying a batch of test cases, collects bug reports (e.g.,
kernel dump image and system log), and resumes replay from kernel panics automatically by leveraging Kdump [41]. We also defined interfaces for users to easily add
new Kprobes and checkers in the format of C macros.

4.6

Experimental Results

In this section, we present the evaluation result of COD. First, we present the
evaluation results of bug detection of COD in Section 4.6.1. It includes all new
vulnerabilities that were found by COD, and evaluation of COD’s ability to find
known vulnerabilities. Second, we measure the replayable rate of test cases generated
by COD on both virtual and physical platforms in Section 4.6.2. Third, based on
the patches we submitted to Linux kernel upstream, we elaborate on how to leverage
COD’s capability of test case replay to locate and fix Linux kernel bugs efficiently
in Section 4.6.3. Finally, we present the comparison of bug detection capability with
kAFL, the state-of-the-art fuzzing engine capable of testing unmodified Linux kernels.
If not stated otherwise, the evaluations were performed on a desktop system with an
Intel i7-4770 processor @ 3.40GHz and 16GB DDR3 RAM @ 1600MHz running 64-bit
Ubuntu 14.04.6 operating system.
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Table 4.1: List of LKMs Evaluated by COD
Subsystem

Main LKM

Dependent LKMs

e100

mii

e1000

-

pcnet32

mii

ne2k-pci

8390

8139too(cp)

mii

tg3

ptp, pps core

Network

snd intel8x0

snd-ac97-codec, ac97 bus, snd-pcm,
snd-timer, snd, soundcore

Sound

snd hda codec generic,snd hda codec,
snd hda intel

snd hda core, snd hwdep,snd pcm,
snd timer, snd, soundcore

snd ens1370

snd rawmidi, snd seq devicesnd pcm,
snd timer, snd, soundcore

4.6.1

Bug Detection

To highlight the effectiveness of our engine, we applied COD to LKMs that are
widely used and validated both in industry and academia. Table 4.1 shows the list
of LKMs we evaluated with COD, and Table 4.2 shows the test harnesses we used in
our experiments. All the main LKMs have been released at least 14 years [111]. They
are also being actively maintained by the Linux kernel community and large vendors,
such as RedHat, SUSE, Broadcom, and Intel. This is because those LKMs are providing important functionality to modern computer systems, such as Ethernet device
drivers, network middleware, HDA codec, and core sound module, etc. For the same
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Table 4.2: List of Test Harnesses
Idx.

Test Harness

Target

insmod xxx
ifconfig ens4 up
dhclient ens4
LKMs from
1

ip route add xxx dev ens4
network
ethtool xxx ens4 xxx
subsys.
ping -I ens4 -c 1 -W 1 xxx
curl --interface ens4 xxx
rmmod xxx
insmod xxx

2

LKMs from
speaker-test -l 1
sound subsys.
rmmod xxx

reason, many of the LKMs, e.g., E1000, PCNet32, 8139too and snd ens1370, have
been studied and used as benchmarks for evaluation by numerous previous research
prototypes [9, 26, 92].
We applied COD for test generation with a time-out of 24 hours on each main
LKM along with their dependent LKMs as listed in Table 4.1. By replaying all
generated test cases with COD on both virtual and physical machines, COD reported
a total of 5 new distinct vulnerabilities from 4 different kernel module. As shown
in Table 4.3, COD detected various kinds of vulnerabilities, including null-pointer
dereference, resource leak, and kernel API misuse. All the bugs were reported to the
Linux kernel community, and were patched immediately. The links of the submitted
bugs are omitted for double-blind review purpose.
We now take Bug 1 as an example to explain why COD is able to generate test

62

Table 4.3: New Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities Detected by COD
Index

LKM

Bug Description

Patch hash

1

E1000

Resource Leak

ee400a3

2

E1000

Null-pointer dereference

cf1acec

3

Pcnet32

Resource leak

d7db318

4

8139too(cp)

Kernel API misuse

a456757

5

hda intel

Null-pointer dereference

a3aa60d

cases from COTS LKMs to trigger and report the new flaws in Table 4.3. Bug 1
is detected by TC Replayer during the replay of COD generated test cases, where
kAPI checker reported a piece of memory allocated by function

kmalloc is not

paired with any memory de-allocation function. By examining test cases triggering
this bug, we found COD only flipped a single kernel API return from the initial
test case. COD was able to explicitly flip these single API returns because there
are conditional branches in the target LKM depending on the flipped API returns.
By leveraging concolic execution, COD was able to negate these branch conditions
precisely, generate a compact set of test cases to explore new code in the LKM and
finally catch the bug with TC Replayer and kAPI checker. For the similar reason,
COD flipped more kernel APIs, generated LKM test cases with the right kernel API
combination to reach error paths, and finally reported these vulnerabilities with TC
Replayer.
We also evaluated COD’s ability to find previous known vulnerabilities. We chose
an older version of the Linux kernel v3.13, which was released on Jan 2014 and
was the default kernel for Long-term-support release of Ubuntu 14.04. We selected
two LKMs that COD did not report new issues as target main LKMs, namely E100
and NE2K-PCI. By running COD to generate test cases for 24 hours on each LKM
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Table 4.4: Average Replayable Rate of Test Case Replay
Test Harness

Complete Harness

‘insmod/rmmod’ Only

Platforms

VM

PM

VM

PM

snd-intel-hda

100%

100%

100%

100%

E1000

95.31%

96.76%

100%

100%

set, 3 bugs were detected, including 1 null-pointer dereference, 1 resource leak from
E100, and 1 resource leak from ne2k-pci. To the best of our knowledge, by manually
browsing the patches of the target LKMs since version v3.13, we believe COD covered
all known vulnerabilities of target LKMs related to null-pointer deference and resource
leak.
4.6.2

Test Case Replay

In this section, we measure the replayable rates (Section 4.4.4) of test cases
generated by COD. We selected two examples from Table 4.1, namely e1000 and
snd-hda-intel along with their dependent LKMs, and used the test harness as shown
in Table 4.2. We also evaluated each example with test harnesses that only contains
‘insmod/rmmod’, considering LKM complexity stems mostly from initialization and
cleanup code [53]. We performed evaluations on both virtual platform, using qemu
v2.3 in KVM mode, and physical platform, using a desktop system with Intel Pentium
processor @ 3.2GHz with 1GB RAM. For each set of LKMs, we first run its test
harness once to record a test case, and then replay the test case with the same test
harness to measure the replayable rate.
Table 4.4 shows the average replayable rate for running each set of LKMs repeatedly for 1000 times with different test harness. The results show that the replayable
rate is 100% for snd-intel-hda with all test harness and e1000 with test harness
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of ‘insmod/rmmod’ only, on both virtual and physical platforms. Also, inconsistencies are observed from the experiments on e1000 with complete test harness. This
is mainly caused by non-determinism from communications with remote machines
when executing commands ping and curl. An interesting observation is that the
replayable rate from physical machine is higher than virtual machine for e1000. We
believe the reason is that the network vitalization of virtual machine depends on the
host machine’s network which has a more dynamic environment and brings extra nondeterminism. We also want to point out that, with the test harness of ‘insmod/rmmod’
only, the replayable rate is always 100% for both sets of LKMs evaluated on both virtual and physical platforms, which shows the potential of COD in testing various
LKMs’ initialization and cleanup code.
4.6.3

Bug Patching Example

By leveraging COD’s capability of automated test case replay, we were able to
reproduce, debug, analyze and finally fix all the detected bugs listed in Table 4.3.
We are all new to network and sound subsystem of Linux kernel, especially have no
previous knowledge and experience of the specific LKMs that COD reported new
bugs. Despite of that, we fixed all the bugs efficiently. The total time to fix each bug
was ranging from 1 hour to 3 hours. We submitted all our patches to the Linux kernel
upstream, and all patches were accepted immediately by the subsystem maintainers.
Especially, three of our patches were selected and merged to the stable tree of Linux
kernel. These patches are back-ported to various long-term-support release of Linux
OS, e.g., Ubuntu 16.04/18.04 and Debian 8/9, and are now running on numerous
machines.
We now elaborate on a few examples of how COD assisted us to patch the reported
vulnerabilities. For Bug 1 in table 4.3, we took three steps to fix it. Figure 4.4 shows
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1

// Allocation site

2

i n t e1 00 0_ al lo c_ qu eu es

3

( s t r u c t e1000_adapter * adapter , ...) {
...; adapter - > tx_ring = kcalloc (...) ;

4
5

}

6

// Branch Negated by COD

7

int e1000_setup_rx_resources

8

( s t r u c t e1000_adapter * adapter , ...) {
...;

9

rxdr - > buffer_info = vzalloc ( size ) ;

10

i f (! rxdr - > buffer_info ) return - ENOMEM ;

11

...;

return 0;

12

}

13

// Deallocation site

14

i n t e 10 0 0 _s e t _r i n gp a r a m (...) {

15

...; tx_old = adapter - > tx_ring ; ...;

16

i f ( netif_running ( adapter - > netdev ) )

17

{...; kfree ( tx_old ) ; ...;}; ...; }

Figure 4.4: Excerpt of LKM E1000 related to Bug 1 from Table 4.3.
the code excerpt related to this bug.
Step 1: locate the ‘allocation site’. We started with the bug report produced
by kAPI checker in TC Replayer. The report looks like the following:
[Resource leak]
address:

0xf1717ac0,

alloc site:

kmalloc @ 0x47aa (e1000),

command in harness:

‘ifconfig ens4 up’,

which means that the kernel memory with virtual address 0xf1717ac0 was allocated
by function

kmalloc from offset 0x47aa of LKM E1000 during the execution of

command ‘ifconfig ens4 up’, and it was never paired with a corresponding mem-
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ory de-allocation function. The linux-image-dbgsym package [4] on Ubuntu allows
mapping an offset from stripped LKMs to their source code. In this way, we located
the allocation site that was in function e1000 alloc queues as shown in line 4 of
Figure 4.4.
Step 2: find the ‘de-allocation site’. The major challenge to fix a resource
leak bug is to find the right place in the code to de-allocate the leaked memory. Fixing
this bug is practically more challenging considering no prior knowledge and the size
of the module E1000 (over 11k lines of code). COD also contributed to tackle this
problem by providing not only the test case π 0 that can be used to reproduce the
current bug, but also providing a reference test case π from which the test case π 0
is generated from. Root-causing the issue would be easier by cross-referencing the
execution of π and π 0 . The test case π 0 is generated by concolic execution engine
from π by flipping the branch condition b along exercising the test case π. In this
example, COD flipped the return value of the kernel API in line 9 of Figure 4.4 and
generated test case π 0 . By replaying test case π with COD and checking its kAPI
trace captured by kAPI Tracer, we located the same ‘allocation site’ and its pair deallocation function. We now have a reference ‘de-allocation site’ that is from function
e1000 set ringparam as show in line 17 of Figure 4.4.
Step 3: analyze the reason of resource leak and write a patch. To understand why test case π 0 triggered the resource leak while its reference test case π did not,
we checked the code near the negated branch in function e1000 setup rx resources.
This function returns on success with test case π, and returns on error with test case
π 0 . It is invoked during the execution of command ‘ifconfig ens4 up’ as part of
the initialization of E1000 network interface. Returning on error of this function leads
to the failure of the initialization and notifies the base kernel that the current network
interface is not up. By checking the ‘free site’, we noticed the de-allocation function
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is guarded by a condition that is true only when the network interface is running, as
shown in line 16 of Figure 4.4. Finally, we fixed the bug by moving the de-allocation
function out of the condition check. The whole process of debugging and fixing the
bug took us less than one hour by using COD.
Kernel vulnerabilities involving pointer operations, e.g., the null-pointer dereference in Bug 5 in table 4.3, are among the most common and critical bugs, while is
notoriously difficult to debug and fix. As elaborated in Charm [104], the debugging
process usually starts from the crash site to backtrack the usage of vulnerable pointer
by using GDB (breakpoint, watch-point, single-step, etc.). With the help of COD,
we not only quickly pinpointed the crash site, but also easily located the source of
the null-pointer dereference that is the location of negated branch. Starting from the
source of the bug and tracing down, we were able to fix the Bug 5 within three hours.
4.6.4

Comparison with kAFL

To have an apple-to-apple comparison with kAFL [94], we adopted the example
in their evaluation for comparing with other state-of-the-art kernel fuzzers. It is a
custom kernel module that is a JSON parser, decodes user inputs, and contains a
known vulnerability. They demonstrated that kAFL was able to learn correct JSON
syntax, and finally trigger the known vulnerability in around 8 minutes, while other
fuzzers failed. The vulnerability was triggered by matching string "kAFL" byte by
byte. To further challenge both kAFL and COD, we modified the crashing condition
which now computes a hash value [96] from multiple JSON tokens of the parsed input
string and matches the hash value with the hash value of "LKM"(see Figure 4.5).
As kAFL requires special CPU features, e.g., Intel VT-x and Intel-PT, all experiments are conducted on a system with an Intel 3.76GHz Xeon E-2176G processor
and 32GB RAM. We run kAFL in single process mode, as the multi-process mode of
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1

// Robert Sedgewick Hash function

2

unsigned i n t RSHash ( const char * str ,
unsigned i n t len ) ;

3
4
5

jsmn_parser p ;

6

jsmntok_t tokens [5];

7

jsmn_init (& p ) ;

8
9
10

i n t res = jsmn_parse (& p , input , len , tokens , 5) ;
i f ( res != 3 &&

11

tokens [0]. type == JSMN_PRIMITIVE &&

12

tokens [1]. type == JSMN_PRIMITIVE &&

13

tokens [2]. type != JSMN_PRIMITIVE )

return ;

14
15

char arr [3] = { input [ tokens [0]. start ] ,

16

input [ tokens [1]. start ] ,

17

input [ tokens [2]. start ]};

18
19

i f ( RSHash ( arr , 3) == RSHash ( " LKM " , 3) )
panic ( KERN_INFO " LKM ...\ n " ) ;

Figure 4.5: Excerpt of JSON parser kernel module used for comparing with kAFL.
kAFL does not show much efficiency benefit and sometimes is even less efficient as
showed in their evaluations. We performed 3 repeated experiments for both kAFL
and COD with a timeout of 24 hours. We measured the time and the number of test
cases being exercised to find the known crash.
In the experiments, on average, COD was able to trigger the crash within 16
hours after exercising 52K test cases on average, while kAFL failed to detect the
crash within 24 hours and exercised 5500 times more test cases (around 290M) than
COD. Actually, kAFL stops finding new paths after about 100 minutes of running.
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This indicates that fuzzing, even with advanced coverage feedback algorithm and
speed boost from newest hardware features, is not capable of finding vulnerabilities
that requires complicated and precise conditions. It aligns with the discussion of
kAFl’s limitations in their paper, which concluded that it remains an open research
problem how to deal with these situations on the kernel level [94]. Our work on
COD is attacking this research problem by extending concolic execution to kernel
modules. The experiment results demonstrate that concolic execution is still a very
effective technique to detect kernel vulnerabilities on binary-level, and is a strong
complimentary testing approach to fuzzing on kernel level.

4.7
4.7.1

Related Work
Kernel Vulnerability Detection

Static analysis [12] on Linux kernel source code is very popular, because it normally
has no requirement for hardware devices, can be applied to a broad range of the kernel
code, and is promising to deliver verification (at least on a specific property of the
kernel). Its effectiveness has been demonstrated by many recent tools, e.g., LDV [119],
WHOOP [30] Dr. Checker [80], DSAC [8], DEADLINE [116], DCNS [7]. However,
static analysis is facing major challenges, including (1) prone to false positives because
of the pointer-heavy nature of kernel code, (2) ill-suited for detecting run-time errors
involving multiple modules, (3) requiring access to source code, and (4) not easily
usable by general developers on new kernel modules [44].
In recent years, dynamic analysis over Linux kernel has received increasingly attention. Especially, feedback-driven fuzzing is proved to be a very effective technique
to unveil various vulnerabilities in systems software. Many recent efforts were spent
on extending fuzzing on user-level applications (especially AFL [1]) to kernel level,
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e.g., TriforceAFL [45], kAFL [94], syzkaller [40], DIFUZE [28], and Razzer [51]. Robustness testing of Linux kernel with fault injection is also an effective technique.
Two examples are KFI [26] and DHTest [9]. Many of these tools either still heavily rely on the source code availability [9, 28] that is not applicable to COTS kernel
and LKMs, or perform blindly fuzzing and explore the same execution path repeatedly [26, 40, 45, 94] that is inefficient to detect bugs. Also, most of these tools are
limited to fuzzing the system call interface of Linux kernel and do not support LKM
interfaces.
4.7.2

Symbolic and Concolic Execution

Symbolic execution [10] is a program analysis technique that takes symbolic inputs, maintains different execution states and constraints of each path in a program,
and utilizes scheduling heuristics [18] to effectively explore the execution tree of the
target program. Concolic execution [97] leverages a concrete execution path to guide
symbolic execution to achieve better scalability [16]. Both of them have been largely
adopted for automated test case generation and bug detection of software on both
source and binary level [6,15,17,25,39,102,103,113,117]. Some representative work of
applying symbolic or concolic execution to kernel code are DDT [65], SymDrive [92],
and CAB-Fuzz [57]. They heavily rely on source-level instrumentation to perform
effective dynamic analysis [92], or do not produce actionable test cases [57, 65] that
are crucial for efficient replay and debugging on detected problems [31].
4.7.3

Kernel Bug Patching and Mining

Our work is also related to automated kernel patching [70].

The Coccinelle

project [76] allows software developers to write code manipulation rules with a generalization of the patch syntax [85], and have automatically generated over 6, 000
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commits to the Linux kernel. Instead of generating patches to fix kernel bugs automatically, our work tries to improve the process of kernel bug patching by generating
actionable test cases for COTS LKMs and enabling automated replay of detected
bugs. Additionally, The assertions we defined in COD’s kAPI Checker (for proactively detecting common kernel bugs) were inspired by previous works on repository
mining of Linux kernel [60, 71, 108], e.g., detecting resource leak with paired function [77].

4.8

Discussion

We have demonstrated COD can generate compact sets of test cases from COTS
LKM interfaces, detect various kinds of kernel vulnerabilities, and enable automated
test case replay to assist efficient debugging and patching of detected bugs. However,
there are limitations of this approach and directions for future work, which we will
discuss in this section.
Hardware inputs to LKMs. Our approach focuses on the software interactions
within the Linux kernel, and does not analyze the effects from hardware inputs to
the LKMs. As a result, COD cannot detect bugs of LKMs related to hardware
inputs. Also, without a symbolic model to emulate missing hardware modules in
the VM (specifically qemu [11]), COD cannot effectively analyze LKMs requiring
unsupported hardware in the VM. Symbolic device [92] is a potential solution to
support hardware inputs, and can be incorporated into COD.
Bottleneck of concolic execution. As a concolic testing approach, COD’s
performance for test case generation is bounded by theoretical limits such as state
explosion and expensive constraint solving. We believe fuzzing provide an effective
complimentary to concolic testing. We are planning to swap CRETE, the concolic
engine in COD’s prototype, with state-of-art fuzzers, e.g., kAFL, to perform fuzzing
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on LKM interfaces. The major effort will be re-designing a kernel hypercall interface
to consume fuzzed buffer from kAFL, and convert it to a sequence of LKM invocations.
All other parts of COD should be readily reused.
Manual efforts. While COD is mostly automated, developers’ manual efforts
are still needed in three situations. First, as Linux kernel chose not to adopt a stable
interface for LKMs [62], users need to pay attention to the changes of kernel APIs
when applying COD to a new version of kernel, and may need to adjust the Kprobes
defined in COD. Second, users need to double check all reported bugs because COD
can have false alarms. False alarms mainly stem from invalid kernel API models
or kernel non-determinism, as kernel API keeps changing, and COD alleviates and
tolerates non-determinism, but not removing it. Third, users’ manual efforts are
required to extend COD to detect new category of bugs, e.g., adding assertions on new
kernel API usages, or defining properties about concurrency to detect race conditions,
etc. We believe repository mining over Linux kernel [71] can be leveraged to automate
the process of tracking kernel API change across different versions and extracting the
valid constraint of kernel APIs.
Improvement on the prototype. COD now only supports x86 architecture,
but we would like to explore its potential on analyzing COTS LKMs from embedded
systems. Also, the current workflow of COD for test case generation does not exploit
the potential of multiprocessing and parallelism, and exchanges data through slow
socket communication across different components. We are planning to optimize the
workflow of COD to improve efficiency.

4.9

Summary

In this chapter, we presented COD, an automated testing framework for COTS
LKMs in Linux kernel. COD generates compact sets of test cases from LKM interfaces

73
using concolic execution, proactively checks for common kernel bugs with embedded
checkers, and allows to reproduce reported bugs repeatedly with actionable test cases
on both virtual and physical platforms. We evaluated our prototype of COD on
more than 20 LKMs covering the network and sound subsystems of Linux kernel.
The experiments showed that COD detected various kinds of kernel bugs, including
5 new vulnerabilities from LKMs that have been maintained and validated for over
14 years. Through patching all the detected flaws in the Linux kernel upstream, we
demonstrated the potential of COD’s automated test case replay in assisting efficient
debugging and fixing of kernel bugs. With the comparison between COD and kAFL,
the state-of-the-art kernel fuzzer, we showed that concolic execution remains as an
effective complementary testing technique to fuzzing on the kernel level.
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5

Hardware/Software Co-validation of Systems-on-Chips

Many recent approaches have been proposed to improve the quality of Systemson-Chips (SoC), mainly focusing on a specific part of the SoC, e.g., device driver,
hardware, firmware, etc. System-level validation of the entire SoC stack remains a
major challenge, and so far research on end-to-end validation of SoC that covers both
hardware and software (HW/SW) components is comparatively sparse. In this chapter, we present an approach to end-to-end concolic testing for HW/SW co-validation
of SoC [19]. Based on the simulation of SoC with multiple virtual platforms, we
capture a set of run-time traces from different components of the entire SoC, and
assemble them into holistic system-level traces. We also provide instrumentation interfaces over the SoC trace for custom validation and analysis, allowing insertions of
user-defined assertions and symbolic values at various HW/SW interfaces. The instrumented trace is replayed in a concolic/symbolic engine to generate new system-level
test cases that either explore new paths of the SoC stack or trigger assertions. We
emulated a complete SoC stack based on several open-source projects, from which we
demonstrated that our approach can generate effective system-level test cases which
crosscut the entire HW/SW stack of SoC and pinpoint an IP firmware buggy path
from the user inputs to the host SW, and can catch various bugs with user-defined
assertions including two bugs of qemu’s E1000 Virtual Device.
In summary, our approach makes the following contributions:
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• System-level analysis framework. We propose an approach to capturing
holistic system-level traces of a SoC emulated by multiple VPs, through end-toend tracing and assembling. This enables system-level analysis over the entire
SoC stack.
• Instrumentation interface for custom validation and analysis. We define an instrumentation interface over the SoC trace, allowing insertions of userdefined assertions and symbolic values at various HW/SW interfaces. This enables symbolic/concolic analysis of the captured trace to generate system-level
test cases for exploring new SoC paths and validating system-level properties.
• Prototype Implementation and Evaluation. We emulated a complete SoC
stack based on qemu and Emu8051, implemented a prototype based on CRETE.
Our evaluation shows that our prototype generates effective system-level tests,
and catches various bugs using user-defined assertions.

5.1

Background

In this section, we first present how an entire SoC stack is emulated with multiple
VPs, and then we introduce Virtual Devices (VDs) in qemu [11], which are important
hardware models used in our prototype.
5.1.1

SoC Stack over Virtual Platforms

A SoC stack consists of hardware and software components. The hardware components usually contain a main processor, RAM and other hardware IPs, such as GPU,
network device, etc. Each hardware IP can have its own core and RAM. The SoC
software components normally consist of host software stack and IP firmware. Host
software stack includes applications, OS and drivers, which are running on the main
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Figure 5.1: SoC stack on virtual platforms.
processor of the SoC. The driver provides a software interface to the SoC hardware
components, enabling the OS to access SoC hardware functions. A set of applications
can be shipped with a SoC as interfaces for users to manage and configure the SoC
hardware. The IP firmware runs on its IP core, which provides fine control over the
hardware IP and defines low-level functionalities. System-level validation over a SoC
is to validate its entire HW/SW stack, which is the focus of this work.
VPs are software systems that emulate physical computing systems. By providing
functionalities of the emulated system, a VP allows execution of software and OS
written for a different architecture. As shown in Fig. 5.1, the hardware stack of a
SoC can be emulated with multiple VPs. A host VP emulates the main processor
with the main RAM, allowing native host software execution. An IP VD emulates the
interface and hardware logic of a hardware IP. The IP core and RAM are emulated
by a different VP, which supports running native IP firmware.
5.1.2

Virtual Devices in QEMU

We adopt qemu as the host VP for our implementation, because it is a wellmaintained open-source project, and supports various IP VDs. VDs are fully functional software models of hardware IP, and usually implemented as a part of the VP.
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1

// Virtual device state

2

typedef s t r u c t E1000State_st {

3

uint32_t mac_reg [0 x8000 ]; // Interface Registers

4

uint32_t rxbuf_size ;

5

...;

// Internal variables

6

} E1000State ;

7

// Interface function : write interface register

8

void e1000_mmio_write ( E1000State *s , uint64_t index ,
uint64_t val ) {

9
10

s - > mac_reg [ index ] = val ;

11

switch ( index ) {

12

case RCTL :
s - > rxbuf_size = rxbufsize ( val ) ; ...; break ;

13
14

...;

15

}

16

}

17

// Internal function : calculate receive buffer size

18

s t a t i c i n t rxbufsize ( uint32_t v ) {

19

v &= E1000_RCTL_BSEX | E 1 0 00 _ R CT L _ SZ _ 1 63 8 4 | ...;

20

switch ( v ) {

21

case E10 00_RCT L_SZ_5 12 : return 512;

22

...;

23

}

24

} ...

Figure 5.2: Excerpt of E1000 virtual device from qemu.
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For example, Fig. 5.2 is the E1000 VD implemented in qemu. It defines a struct of
E1000State to model E1000 hardware state, such as interface registers and receive
buffer size. It also provides a set of interface functions, such as e1000 mmio write,
for qemu to trigger VD internal functions. The VD internal functions, such as
rxbufsize, realize internal functionalities of an IP hardware.

5.2

Preliminary Definitions

In this section, we introduce a set of preliminary definitions formalized in our
approach.
Definition 2 (Trace) A trace τ , hr, s, πi of a system S is a triple, where r is a
stimulus (or request) to system S, s is the state of system S before processing stimulus
r, and π , (i0 , i1 , · · · , in ) is a sequence of machine-level instructions which represents
an execution path of system S for processing stimulus r.
Informally, a trace τ models that given a stimulus r, a system transits from state
s following the execution path π. An instruction i ∈ π is either a normal instruction
that only interacts with the state of current system s, or a special instruction that
triggers interactions with other systems. The trace τ is an abstract definition; thus
applies to host software, virtual device, and firmware.
Definition 3 (Host Software Trace) A Host Software Trace is a triple τ h , hrh ,
sh , π h i, where rh is the host software stimulus which is application inputs from users.
sh is the state of SoC host VP, and is a pair hshcpu , shmem i, where shcpu is a set of CPU
registers with their values, and shmem is a set of memory cell values. π h is the execution
path of the host software.
Informally, ih ∈ π h is either an instruction that only interacts with state sh , or
a special operation that triggers interactions with VD such as MMIO and Port I/O

79
operations.
Definition 4 (Virtual Device Trace) A Virtual Device Trace is a triple τ v ,
hrv , sv , π v i, where rv is the VD stimulus which is the request from the device driver,
the VD state sv is a set of device registers with their values, and the VD execution
path π v is the execution path of the VD.
Informally, iv ∈ π v is either an instruction that only interacts with VD state sv , or
a special operation that triggers interactions with firmware, such as calls to interface
functions of the IP Core VP.
Definition 5 (Firmware Trace) A Firmware Trace is a triple τ f , hrf , sf , π f i,
where rf is the request from VD, sf , hsfcpu , sfmem i is the state of IP Core VP which
consists of CPU and memory states, π f is the execution path of firmware.
Definition 6 (SoC System-level Trace) An SoC System-level Trace is a 5-tuple
τ S , hrh , sh , S v , S f , π S i, where rh and sh are the stimulus and state of the host soft

f
f
f
v
f
v
v v
ware respectively, S , (s0 , s1 , · · · , sm ) is a sequence of VD states, S , s0 , s1 , · · · , sn
is a sequence of FW states, and π S is an execution path of the SoC.
Informally, for the simplicity of presentation, we assume a SoC system-level trace
τ S contains only one stimulus from user input, and interacts with only one IP hardware. Hence, τ S is composed of only one host SW trace with a sequence of VD
traces and FW traces. The SoC execution path π S is composed of instructions from
host SW path π h , VD path π v , FW path π f , and special NOP instructions (defined in
Sec. 5.3.2). A SoC trace with multiple stimulus is simply a sequence of τ S we defined.
Also, a SoC trace with multiple IP hardware can be modeled by extending current
definition with a set of VD states {S v } and FW states {S f }.

80

SoC Host VP
Host VP Tracer

IP VD
VD Tracer

IP Core VP
IP VP Tracer

Host SW Traces

VD Traces

FW Traces

Instrumentation
Interface
for Analysis

Trace Assembler

Concolic/
Symbolic
Engine

Figure 5.3: Architecture and workflow of end-to-end concolic testing for hardware/software co-validation: (1) execute SoC software stack over different VPs with partitioned VDs; (2) capture segmented traces from UOD, VD and firmware respectively;
(3) assemble a system-level trace and inject system- level assertions; (4) inject symbolic values at HW/SW interfaces and perform concolic-symbolic hybrid execution,
generating test cases to cover new usage of the SoC or trigger assertions.

5.3

Design

As shown in Fig. 5.3, our approach mainly has two phases, on-line tracing and
off-line analysis. At run-time (on-line), we perform end-to-end tracing over the entire
SoC stack emulated by multiple VPs, from which a sequence of traces is captured,
including Host SW Traces, VD Traces, and Firmware Traces. Statically (off-line), we
assemble segmented traces into a holistic system-level trace, provide instrumentation
interfaces for user-defined assertions and symbolic values over the assembled trace,
and utilize concolic/symbolic engines to generate test cases that either explore new
usages of the SoC or trigger user-defined assertions.
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5.3.1

End-to-End Run-time Tracing

As shown in Fig. 5.3, a set of tracers are provided to each SoC hardware component
for run-time tracing. The tracer for host SW is an extension to the SoC host VP.
When a target application is invoked, the tracer captures user inputs as rh , and
takes a snapshot of the VP’s CPU and memory as sh . It also monitors the complete
execution of host SW to capture a sequence of machine-level instructions as the
execution path of host SW π h . The VD tracer is a wrapper to the IP VD, which
intercepts all interactions between the IP VD and the SoC host VP. For each host
SW/VD interaction, the tracer captures the VD requests (e.g. e1000 mmio write in
Fig. 5.2) as rv , and takes the snapshot of the VD state (e.g. E1000State in Fig. 5.2)
as sv . The π v is a concrete execution path of the VD, and can be derived from the
VD source code with the captured rv . The tracer for firmware is an extension to the
IP Core VP. For each request from VD, it captures the request input as rf , takes a
snapshot of the VP’s CPU and memory before the execution of the firmware as sf , and
monitors the complete execution of the firmware to capture a sequence of machinelevel instructions as the execution path of firmware π f . A unified instruction format
is needed to make traces captured by different tracers compatible. We choose to use
llvm IR [69] as the unified instruction format. As a result, instruction translators
may be needed as a part of the run-time tracer to produce instruction sequences in
llvm IR.
5.3.2

System-level Trace Assembling

As shown in Algorithm 1, our system-level trace assembler takes τ h , T v , T f as
inputs, where τ h is the captured host SW trace, T v is a sequence of captured VD
traces, and T f is a sequence of captured firmware traces. The project operator State
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Algorithm 1: Assemble-Sys-Trace τ h , T v , T f
1

hrh , sh , π h i ← τ h

2

S v ← map (State, T v ) , S f ← map State, T f

3

π ← []

4

foreach ih ∈ π h do





. initialize π to be an empty sequence

5

if ih is normal instruction then Append(π, ih )

6

else

. ih interacts with virtual device

7

Append(π, NopEnterVd)

8

hrv , sv , π v i ← Next(T v )

9

foreach iv ∈ π v do

10

if iv is normal instruction then Append(π, iv )

11

else

. iv interacts with firmware

12

Append(π, NopEnterFw)

13

hrf , sf , π f i ← Next(T f )

14

foreach if ∈ π f do

15

16

17

18

Append(π, if )
Append(π, NopLeaveFw)
Append(π, NopLeaveVd)
return hrh , sh , S v , S f , πi

takes a trace hr, s, πi and returns the state element s. The check on whether an
instruction i ∈ π is a special instruction or not is implementation-dependent, which is
related to the instruction set of the target VP and how it emulates its interaction with
VDs. Function Append (x, y) appends element y to the end of sequence x. Function
Next (x) returns the first element in the sequence x, and removes the element from
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x. Special NOPs in the execution path of the system-level trace include NopEnterVd,
NopLeaveVd, NopEnterFw, and NopLeaveFw to assist the execution transition between
host software and VD, or between VD and firmware. For example, NopEnterVd
correlates a special host SW instruction with a VD stimulus rv , synchronizes the VD
state with sv , and transfers execution to VD, while NopLeaveVd propagates VD’s
return value back to sh and transfers execution back to host SW. NopEnterFw and
NopLeaveFw provide similar functionalities at the VD/FW interface.
5.3.3

Instrumentation Interface for System-level Analysis

Algorithm 2: Interpret-Sys-Trace τ S , callbacks
1

hrh , sh , S v , S f , π S i ← τ S

2

foreach i ∈ π S do

3

switch i do

4

case NopEnterVd : sv ← Next(S v )

5

case NopEnterFw : sf ← Next(S f )

6

otherwise Execute(hsh , sv , sf i, i)

7
8



if i is Nops then
Process-Callbacks(hrh , sh , sv , sf i, callbacks)

Algorithm 2 shows the algorithm to interpret the system-level trace τ S . The interpreter iterate through all the instructions in the execution path π S , and execute them
in sequence. When NopEnterVd and NopEnterFw are encountered, we synchronize the
VD and firmware states from the captured states accordingly. The callbacks defined
as the second argument in algorithm 2 serves as an instrumentation interface to allow
the user to easily inject custom functionalities and checks. The user-defined callback
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functions are written in high-level programming languages, such as C. Those callback
functions will be called at corresponding special NOPs. User-defined functions have
access to various run-time states in the SoC trace τ S , namely rh , sh , sv , and sf , and
the information from HW/SW interactions, e.g. value writing from the IP driver to
VD interface registers. In this way, users can check properties related the state of host
SW, VD and FW, as well as properties related to HW/SW interactions. For example,
users can put an assertion to check whether user inputs to IP applications from host
SW can cut-across the entire SoC HW/SW stack, and directly control the execution
state of IP firmware. Also, users can introduce symbolic values at different levels of
SoC stack, mainly at the HW/SW interfaces. This enables more thorough exercise
of the captured SoC trace, making concolic/symbolic hybrid execution possible. This
also allows users to make trade-offs between soundness and completeness over analysis
of the SoC trace, which is similar to various consistency models described in S2E [25].

5.4

Implementation

This section presents our full-stack emulation of SoC with two open-source VPs,
and illustrates some implementation details of our prototype.
5.4.1

Full-stack Emulation of SoC

To build the full-stack emulation framework, we adopt qemu as the SoC host
VP, and use Emu8051 as the IP core VP, as shown in Fig. 5.4. qemu emulates an
X86 platform, a popular architecture of SoC processor, while Emu8051 emulates an
8051 platform, a representative architecture of IP cores. qemu VDs are used to emulate IP hardware devices. We made several modifications to the qemu VDs since
native qemu VDs are complete emulations of hardware IPs. They not only provide
IP hardware interfaces to the SoC host VP, but also abstract all other functionalities
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Figure 5.4: Implementation of end-to-end concolic testing for hardware/software covalidation based on qemu, Emu8051, and CRETE.
with software models, including hardware logic, IP core and firmware. To provide a
cohesive simulation of the SoC hardware stack, we extracted the logic parts which are
typically implemented inside firmware from the VD and executed them on Emu8051.
We modified VDs to communicate with Emu8051 for firmware transactions. The
Emu8051 is modified with interface functions that take inputs from qemu VDs, execute a firmware transaction, and return results to the IP VD. For the software stack,
we run a full-stack of native Linux OS on the x86 platform as host software, including
IP applications, OS kernel, and IP drivers. Given the limited availability of firmware
and its emulators in public, we wrote our own IP firmware based on the IP specification for our prototype. The IP firmware is written in C, compiled to 8051 executable,
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and executed on the Emu8051.
5.4.2

Tracers for qemu, qemu VD, and Emu8051

We leverage the tracing facility of CRETE [20] for qemu to capture traces of
SoC host software. CRETE supports full-stack system tracing, and outputs a selfcontained trace in the format of llvm IR [69], which contains user inputs, states of
CPU and memory, and instruction sequences. CRETE treats all captured instructions
as regular instructions that operate on CPU and memory. We augment CRETE with
the capability to distinguish special instructions that requires VD operations. During
runtime tracing, we intercept every memory transactions issued by qemu’s virtual
CPU, and monitor its address translation from virtual address to physical address.
When the physical address is translated to a device address of the target IP, we capture
the mapping from the CPU address to the device address. The device address is the
index of device interface registers, and is the address that VD can understand and
work with. In a similar way, we capture mappings between CPU port address to device
address by intercepting qemu’s processing of port IOs. The captured mappings are
used to distinguish special operations, e.g. memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) or port
I/O from normal operations when assembling system-level traces.
To capture IP VD traces, we combine both static and dynamic approaches. We
dynamically capture (1) invocations to the VD interface function along with the VD
states; (2) mappings between DMA address and CPU address by monitoring the DMA
operations as a part of the IP VD. Statically, we transform the target IP VD source
code into a self-contained llvm module by writing stubs for its external functions.
Together with the captured run-time information, we can reproduce the execution
path for each VD transaction. Note that the calls to Emu8051 interface functions in
the VD source code are the special instructions that require firmware transactions,
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and can be easily distinguished from other normal operations.
To capture FW traces, we designed and implemented an Emu8051 tracer based on
CRETE. Similar to tracing from qemu, CRETE captures partial traces that represent single execution paths of the emulated firmware from Emu8051. Our observation
shows that both the emulator itself and its software stack are much smaller and simpler comparing with qemu and its software stack. We chose to capture complete
states of Emu8051 at run-time. Especially, we have the whole firmware binary captured with the Emu8051 RAM as a part of the Emu8051 state. Similar to tracing VD
states, we capture the complete Emu8051 state only once along with state differences
between two firmware transactions. We also implemented a stand-alone interpreter of
8051 instructions based on Emu8051. By taking a complete 8051 state and a request
input, the interpreter can reproduce a firmware transaction and returns its result.
5.4.3

System-level Trace Assembler

Our trace assembler provides a set of helper functions, and performs static instrumentation and recompilation over the segmented traces. The NOPs instructions
discussed before are implemented as calls to our helper functions. To have a more
fine-grained control over the host SW/VD/FW interactions, we defined more NOPs
instructions than what is discussed in section 5.3.2. To distinguish MMIO operations, the assembler replaces all the memory operations from the host SW execution path π h with calls to the helper function cpu mem op. This function mainly
checks whether the current memory operation requires a device operation based on
the captured mappings, and it invokes either vd mmio op for device operations or
normal mem op for normal operations. The helper function vd mmio op translates
CPU address to device address, and invokes VD interface functions from the VD
trace, such as e1000 mmio write. Port IO operations are easily distinguished, and

88
are replaced with a helper function vd port io. To bridge DMA operations, the assembler replaces the DMA functions invoked in qemu VDs, such as pci dma read,
with the helper function vd dma op. This helper function translates the DMA address
to CPU address by looking up the captured mapping, and performs corresponding
data copy. Calls to Emu8051 interface functions are the special instructions in the
VD execution path π v , and they are wrapped with calls to helper fw enter and
helper fw ret by the assembler.
5.4.4

Interface for System-level Analysis

The interface is implemented as call-back functions of the helper functions as
discussed in section 5.4.3. Each helper function mainly has two call back functions
which are executed right before and after itself. For example, function vd mmio op has
two call-backs, pre vd mmio op and post vd mmio op. By overwriting those call-back
functions, users define custom checkers as functions written in C, which are compiled
and linked to the system-level trace for analysis. As discussed in section 5.3.3, the
checkers have access to execution states from various layers of the SoC stack. Users
can define arbitrary assertions over those run-time states expressible in C language.
Also, by calling helper function make symbolic in the call backs, symbolic values can
be introduced at SW/HW interfaces. Note that symbolic values introduced in this
way are not restricted with any constraints, and may not be the feasible values at
the HW/SW interfaces of the original SoC stack. This can improve the exploration
efficiency but can introduce false alarms, which is a trade-off between completeness
and soundness [25]. Section 5.5 presents examples of using this interface to inject
system-level assertions and symbolic value.

89

5.4.5

Customized Concolic/symbolic Engine

We implemented an engine for concolic/symbolic hybrid execution based on CRETE.
The concolic engine in CRETE was based on klee that is a symbolic engine. We
augmented the CRETE engine with the ability to switch back and forth concolic and
symbolic execution. To maximize the exploration efficiency, we perform concolic executions on the portion of SoC trace from host SW to respect its partial trace nature,
and perform symbolic execution on the portion of SoC trace from VD and FW to
utilize the full trace nature.

5.5

Experimental Results

In this section, we present the evaluations of our prototype, which demonstrates
the usefulness and effectiveness of its two major capabilities: (1) system-level tracing
over the entire SoC stack; (2) instrumentation interface for custom validation and
analysis.
Experiment Setup.

We evaluated our approach on validating an Ethernet

IP, Intel E1000 Gigabyte Network Adapter [49]. The hardware interface and logic
of the target Ethernet IP is emulated by the E1000 VD in qemu. Table 5.1 shows
the software stack of the emulated SoC. The off-the-shelf host software stack runs on
the host x86 processor, while the firmware runs on the emulated IP 8051 core. The
firmware mainly contains the IP control logic related to the Receive Control Register
RCTL, and is implemented by us based on the Intel E1000 IP specification [49]. We
conduct our experiments on an Intel Core i7-3770 3.40 GHz CPU desktop with 16
GB memory running 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04.5.
System-level Tracing. Table 5.2 shows the stimulus used in our experiments,
which is a set of network application commands. Each stimulus contains some user
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Table 5.1: Target SoC SW Stack

Table 5.2: The SoC Stimulus

ifconfig,

#

Stimulus

ethtool

1

ifconfig eth mtu xxx

OS

Ubuntu 16.04

2

ifconfig eth ether xxx

IP Driver

e1000.ko

3

ethtool -s eth speed xxx

IP FW

Crafted

4

ethtool -s eth advisory xxx

App.

inputs (denoted as xxx in the table). Different stimulus drives the target SoC following
different usages, and produce different traces. Table 5.3 shows the sizes of segmented
traces and system-level traces. Host SW traces are captured in binary-level, and hence
their sizes are measured by the number of basic blocks. For VD and firmware traces,
their sizes are measured by the number of corresponding transactions. System-level
traces are self-contained llvm modules, and their sizes are presented the same as
normal software in terms of Kilobytes. We run our prototype on each stimulus three
times. Table 5.4 shows the average runtime information of end-to-end tracing and
assembling, including the time usage and maximum memory usage. In summary, the
time usage of end-to-end tracing is from 15 to 33 seconds, and memory consumption
is from 364 MB to 541 MB, while the trace assembler took 0.11 to 0.28 seconds, and
consumed 40 MB to 140 MB of memory. It demonstrates that our prototype can
capture system-level traces of the SoC with modest amount of time and memory.
Instrumentation Interface for Custom Validation and Analysis. In this
experiment, we defined eight assertions to enforce eight system-level properties that
the target SoC should hold. These properties are retrieved from the specification
of Intel E1000 network adapter [49]. As shown in Table 5.5, these properties are
related to the Receive Control Register (RCTL) and Control Register (CTRL) of E1000.
Figure 5.5 shows three examples of our assertions, which illustrates how we leverage
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Table 5.3: Sizes of SoC Traces Captured with Each Stimulus
Stimulus

Host SW

VD

Firmware

Sys-Level Trace

Index

(BasicBlock)

(Trans.)

(Trans.)

in llvm (KB)

1

7368

1488

6

1858

2

93

67

0

957

3

692

1179

5

1115

4

660

1116

5

1081

Table 5.4: Runtime of End-to-end Tracing and Assembling
Stimulus

Tracing

Tracing

Assembling

Assembling

Index

Time (s)

Memory (MB)

Time (s)

Memory (MB)

1

32.33

540.97

0.28

140.27

2

32.67

364.38

0.11

39.98

3

15.33

437.76

0.l5

76.54

4

16.33

395.07

0.15

72.58

the instrumentation interface of our framework to express and inject the assertions
into the system-level traces. The assertions in the examples are mainly related to the
interface register RCTL. For example, assertions P 1 and P 2 check properties related
to MMIO at the interface of SW driver and VD. Assertions can also check on the
entire SoC states, such as assertion P 3 is based on both the VD state and user inputs
to stimulus (network applications). We also injected symbolic values at host SW/VD
and VD/FW interfaces, as well as the user inputs to stimulus. Figure 5.5 shows an
example of injecting symbolic values to value which are the input of VD interface
function passed from the IP driver. Then we applied our symbolic/concolic engine to
the instrumented traces for system-level analysis and validation. Table 5.6 shows the

92

Table 5.5: System-level Properties Validated by User-defined Assertions
#

Description

1

The software should only write 0x00/0x01 to RCTL.LBM.

2

When RCTL.BSEX is 0x01, the software should not program
value 0x00 to RCTL.BSIZE.

3

The values 0x10 and 0x11 are reserved to RCTL.DTYP.

4

When RCTL.FLXBUF is not 0x00, the receive buffer size is
represented by the value of RCTL.FLXBUF in KB.

5

When RCTL.DTYP is 0x01, the buffer sizes for the descriptor
are controlled by fields in the PSRCTL register.

6

The first byte of RCTL is reserved.

7

When a write to CTRL is finished, CTRL.RST should always be
cleared by the device every time.

8

The value 0x11 is reserved to CTRL.SPEED.

experiment results over the trace captured from stimulus #1. It contains the number
of test cases being generated, the number of assertions being validated, the number
of assertions being violated, and the number of actual bugs being detected.
Results Analysis. Symbolic values of user inputs to stimulus generated the least
number of test cases, and triggered the least number of assertions since they crosscut
the entire SoC stack and accumulate complete constraints of the SoC execution.
Following the strictest constraints also makes all generated test cases valid to the
entire SoC, and hence does not introduce false alarms. Behind the only assertion
failure triggered by the test cases of application inputs, we discovered a bug in the FW.
Although this bug is hand-crafted, it demonstrates that our approach can precisely
explore the impact of user inputs to the top level of the host SW stack across the
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1

void pre_vd_mmio_op ( uint32_t * reg_idx ,
uint32_t * value , i n t is_write ) {

2
3

// Introduce symbolic values to VD input ’ value ’

4

make_symbolic ( value , * value , s i z e o f (* value ) ) ;

5

i f ( reg_idx == RCTL && is_write ) {

6
7

// P1 : Only 00/01 ’ b is valid to LBM

8

uint8_t lbm = (* value >> LBM ) & 0 x03 ;

9

assert ( lbm == 0 x00 || lbm == 0 x01 ) ;

10

// P2 : 00 ’ b is invalid to DTYP when BSEX is 01 ’ b

11

uint8_t bsex = (* value >> BSEX ) & 0 x01 ;

12

uint8_t bsize = (* value >> BSIZE ) & 0 x03 ;

13

i f ( bsex == 0 x01 )
assert ( bsize != 0 x00 ) ;

14

}

15
16

}

17

void post_vd_mmio_op ( uint32_t reg_idx ,
uint32_t value , i n t is_write ) {

18

i f ( reg_idx == RCTL && is_write ) {

19
20

// P3 : when FLXBUF is not 00 ’b , use FLXBUF

21

//

22

uint8_t flxbuf = ( value >> FLXBUF ) & 0 x0f ;

23

i f ( flxbuf != 0 x00 )
assert ( vd_state . rxbufsize == ( flxbuf * 1024) ) ;

24

}

25
26

in KB as the rx buffer size

}

Figure 5.5: User-defined assertion examples in pseudo C code.
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Table 5.6: Number of Generated Test-cases and Triggered Assertions from Concolicsymbolic Hybrid Execution
User-inputs

Driver/VD

VD/Firmware

to Stimulus

Interface

Interface

Generated Test Cases

20

1001

49

Validated Assertions

5

1

4

Fired Assertions

1

7

2

Detected Bugs

1

3

1

entire SoC HW/SW stack. It generated an exact test case that pinpoints the FW
buggy path from the user inputs to the host SW.
Symbolic values of Driver/VD interfaces generated the largest number of test cases
and triggered the largest number of assertions, while it has a much higher false rate
on assertions triggered. By following partial constraints of the SoC stack, it is easier
to explore partial stack more thoroughly, but it also produces test cases that might be
invalid to the entire SoC stack. Manual efforts are needed to review all the triggered
assertions. In our experiment, there are 7 triggered assertions in total where 3 of
them are real alarms and report real bugs. Besides the FW bug we introduced, two
bugs from the E1000 VD in qemu are detected by our approach. One is reported
by assertion P 3 as shown in Fig. 5.5, both of them are the functionalities that are
required according to the Intel E1000 Manual while not being implemented in qemu’s
E1000 VD. Moreover, as the FW is written by us and has basic logic, the test cases
and triggered assertions from VD/FW interface are much less comparing to those
from Driver/VD interface.
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5.6

Related Work

There has been a lot work on concolic and symbolic testing. Early work focused on
bug detection and test generation for source-level applications, such as DART [38] and
klee [15], while recent work is extended to binary analysis [115], such as S2E [25],
Driller [102], and CRETE [20]. The closest related research is applying concolic
testing to a certain part of the SoC stack with specialized optimizations. For example,
S2E and SymDrive [92] are built for testing system software, especially device drivers,
and Avatar [118] and Inception [29] focus on firmware validation. None of those
systems is able to deal with a complete SoC stack, let alone perform system-level
validation or analysis. Simply combining those systems together for the whole SoC
validation is not feasible either, due to their dramatic differences of the architectures,
designs, and implementations. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
attempt to apply concolic testing to the entire SoC platforms end-to-end.
Much research has been done in the area of HW/SW co-validation which are
close to our work. HW/SW co-verification is a common technique which mainly
uses model checking to verify HW/SW interface protocols against the driver and
various device models [64,82]. Recently research work leverages VDs for HW/SW covalidation and SoC validation [43, 72]. Symbolic execution with VD co-verification is
proposed to verify hardware and firmware interactions [46]. These work either focuses
on device/driver interfaces or device/firmware interfaces. None of these approaches
provide the same benefits as our approach, including interfaces for users to customize
analysis at various SoC layers, and holistic system-level view of the entire SoC stack.
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5.7

Discussion

We have shown that our approach enables end-to-end validation over the SoC,
generates effective system-level test cases, and detects various bugs with user-defined
assertions. However, there are limitations of this approach and directions for improvement, which we will discuss in this section.
5.7.1

Limitations

First, as a testing methodology, our approach provides SoC developers a framework to catch bugs from the entire SoC stack through system-level assertions. It only
reports existence of bugs, and does not guarantee free of bugs. Complete verification [80] is not our goal.
Second, our approach may have false alarms, which can either stem from symbolic values with incomplete constraints as discussed in Section 5.5 or from imprecise
hardware modeling, e.g., VD bugs being reported do not necessarily indicate bugs in
the real IP hardware. Therefore, manual efforts are needed in confirming the raised
alarms. We believe such manual efforts are justified since the reported bugs may not
be real bugs in current SoC composition, but could well be real bugs in a new SoC
using the involved IPs.
Third, as it currently stands, our approach is not well suited to detect bugs caused
by hardware concurrency [48]. In our prototype, we only handle SoCs with one IP,
and assume only one stimulus running at a time. In complex SoCs, there can be
multiple IPs and stimulus running simultaneously, where concurrency can be a good
source of errors and needs to be validated. We will address this in the future work.
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5.7.2

Future Work

We are planning to apply our approach on the SoC with multiple IPs. Our prototype currently supports end-to-end tracing over several IPs, besides E1000, including
EEPro100 (Intel PRO/100 Ethernet adapter), NE2000 (Novell’s Ethernet adapter),
PCNet (AMD Ethernet adapter), and RTL8139 (Realtek Ethernet adapter). Enabling new IPs in our framework is relatively easy, taking us 1 to 3 developer days.
We are extending our prototype to capture traces from multiple IPs and stimulus
simultaneously. The other major challenge is to put together a meaningful SoC with
multiple IPs, given the limited availability of real IP firmware and their emulates in
public. We are actively looking for more interesting IP models, firmware, and VPs.
Second, we will explore techniques to scale our approach to large and complex
SoC systems. One important direction is to enable the iterative process of our approach, applying newly generated test cases back to the end-to-end tracing process
and repeating the whole validation process. We have a primitive iterative framework
running, but it faces challenges of state explosion [25]. We are exploring additional
optimizations, including minimizing sizes of segmented traces, biased search and iteration towards test cases triggering user-defined assertions, and adaptive selection
strategies of SoC components to balance efficiency and effectiveness. What’s more,
we will explore how to introduce symbolic values related to hardware concurrency,
such as symbolic interrupt [92], so that our prototype can be applied to validate
concurrency errors.

5.8

Summary

In this chapter, we presented an approach to HW/SW co-validation on the entire SoC stack through end-to-end concolic testing. Our approach captures run-time
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traces of the entire SoC stack, assembles system-level traces, and provides instrumentation interfaces for custom validation and analysis, allowing insertions of user-defined
assertions and symbolic values at HW/SW interfaces. New system-level test cases can
be generated from the concolic/symbolic analysis over the SoC trace. Our prototype
based on multiple open-source projects demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness
of our approach.
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6

Conclusion

In this dissertation, we introduced versatile binary-level concolic testing, which
significantly improves the applicability and flexibility of symbolic execution, especially to modern computing systems with various components. We also presented the
designs, implementations and evaluations of several systems based on the proposed
approach to make major components of modern computing systems more reliable and
secure, including user applications, Linux kernel modules, firmware, and hardware devices. To conclude, this chapter summarizes the main contributions and highlights
some directions for future research.

6.1

Summary of Contributions

Broadly, this dissertation advanced the state-of-the-art techniques for system validation, enriched the research communities of both academia and industry (specially
for software engineering and security areas) by developing and maintaining opensource systems, and contributed directly to build more reliable and secure computing
systems in the real world by detecting and fixing various unknown bugs and vulnerabilities in many important software systems. In summary, this dissertation makes
the following specific contributions:
• Design and develop CRETE, the infrastructure of versatile binary-level concolic
testing, to enable symbolic execution on modern computing systems, and scale it
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with a set of optimizations, which delivered competitive results comparing with
state-of-the-art tools for automated software analysis and detected numerous
unknown bugs from various real-world applications.
• Design and develop COD, a system for automated bug detection and replay of
COTS Linux kernel modules, which makes the Linux kernel more reliable and
secure by detecting and fixing various unknown vulnerabilities.
• Design and develop an approach to HW/SW co-validation with end-to-end concolic testing, which helps tackle the challenge of system-level validation over the
entire SoC stack.
• Release and maintain the open-source project for CRETE, which supported
several research projects from both academia and industry, including Intel’s
EXCITE project [33] for BIOS security validation.

6.2

Future Directions

In this section, we highlight some most interesting future directions, while more
detailed discussions about limitations and future work can be found in previous sections (Sec. 3.6, Sec. 4.8, and Sec. 5.7).
Refined symbolic interfaces of user applications. All current symbolic and
concolic engines, including CRETE, supports only standard symbolic interfaces of
user applications, e.g., symbolic command-line, symbolic file, and symbolic stdin.
One observation is that user applications are built upon commonly-used libraries
shipped as a part of the operating system, such as libc on Linux systems. Those
system libraries provide services to user applications through well-defined APIs, such
as memory management, and socket communication. One future work is to add
new symbolic interfaces from system library APIs to user applications. For example,
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introducing symbolic values to the return value of malloc can help validate the error
handling code of user applications and is promising to detect memory related issues.
This idea is similar to what we have done in COD, in which we introduced symbolic
values to the return values of kernel API to analyze Linux kernel modules.
Hybrid fuzzing for Linux kernel modules. As a concolic testing approach,
COD’s performance for test case generation is bounded by theoretical limits such
as state explosion and expensive constraint solving. We believe fuzzing provide an
effective complimentary to concolic testing. We plan to combine the concolic engine in
COD’s prototype with state-of-the-art fuzzers, e.g., kAFL, to perform hybrid fuzzing
on LKM interfaces. By leveraging the precision of concolic execution and speed of
fuzzing, we believe more Linux kernel vulnerabilities can be detected and fixed.
Improving the CRETE prototype. The current workflow of CRETE does not
exploit the potential of multiprocessing and parallelism, and exchanges data through
slow socket communication across different components, which provides major opportunities for future optimizations. Also, our current implementation of CRETE
mainly focuses on the x86 architecture and qemu/Emu8051 frontends. Therefore,
another future work is to extend CRETE frontend with more architectures and more
virtual machines to broaden the applicability of the CRETE framework.
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[42] Grosser, T., Größlinger, A., Lengauer, C.: Polly - performing polyhedral optimizations on a low-level intermediate representation. Parallel Processing Letters
22(4) (2012)
[43] Gu, H., Chen, M., Wei, T., Lei, L., Xie, F.: Specification-driven automated
conformance checking for virtual prototype and post-silicon designs. In: Proceedings of the 55th Annual Design Automation Conference, DAC 2018, San
Francisco, CA, USA (2018)
[44] Guo, P.J., Engler, D.: Linux kernel developer responses to static analysis bug
reports. In: Proceedings of the 2009 Conference on USENIX Annual Technical

108
Conference. pp. 22–22. USENIX’09, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA
(2009)
[45] Hertz, J., Newsham, T.:

The triforceafl project. https://github.com/

nccgroup/TriforceAFL.git (2017)
[46] Horn, A., Tautschnig, M., Val, C., Liang, L., Melham, T., Grundy, J., Kroening,
D.: Formal Co-Validation of Low-Level Hardware/Software Interfaces. In: Proc.
of FMCAD (2013)
[47] Hu, M., Wei, T., Zhang, M., Mallet, F., Chen, M.: Sample-guided automated
synthesis for CCSL specifications. In: Proceedings of the 56th Annual Design
Automation Conference 2019, DAC 2019, Las Vegas, NV, USA. pp. 98:1–98:6
(2019)
[48] Huang, B., Ray, S., Gupta, A., Fung, J.M., Malik, S.: Formal security verification of concurrent firmware in socs using instruction-level abstraction for
hardware. In: Proceedings of the 55th Annual Design Automation Conference,
San Francisco, CA, USA (2018)
[49] Intel:

Pci/pci-x family of gigabit ethernet controllers software de-

veloper’s manual. https://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/manual/pci-pci-xfamily-gbe-controllers-software-dev-manual.pdf (2009)
[50] Intel

Corporation:

Intel®

Virtualization

Technology

(Intel®

VT).

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/virtualization/
virtualization-technology/intel-virtualization-technology.html
(2019)

109
[51] Jeong, D.R., Kim, K., Shivakumar, B.A., Lee, B., Shin, I.: Razzer: Finding
kernel race bugs through fuzzing. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP 2019, San Francisco, California, USA (2019)
[52] Jiang, Y., Song, H., Yang, Y., Liu, H., Gu, M., Guan, Y., Sun, J., Sha, L.:
Dependable model-driven development of CPS: from stateflow simulation to
verified implementation. TCPS 3(1) (2019)
[53] Kadav, A., Swift, M.M.: Understanding modern device drivers. In: Proceedings
of the 17th International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming
Languages and Operating Systems, ASPLOS 2012, London, UK. pp. 87–98
(2012)
[54] Kannavara, R., Havlicek, C.J., Chen, B., Tuttle, M.R., Cong, K., Ray, S.,
Xie, F.: Challenges and opportunities with concolic testing. In: 2015 National
Aerospace and Electronics Conference (NAECON). pp. 374–378 (2015)
[55] Kasikci, B., Zamfir, C., Candea, G.: Automated classification of data races
under both strong and weak memory models. ACM Trans. Program. Lang.
Syst. 37(3), 8:1–8:44 (2015)
[56] Kasolik, M.: 8051 emulator. http://emu51.sourceforge.net/
[57] Kim, S.Y., Lee, S., Yun, I., Xu, W., Lee, B., Yun, Y., Kim, T.: Cab-fuzz:
Practical concolic testing techniques for COTS operating systems. In: 2017
USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2017, Santa Clara, CA,
USA. pp. 689–701 (2017)
[58] King, J.C.: Symbolic execution and program testing. Commun. ACM 19(7),
385–394 (1976)

110
[59] Komppa, J.: 8051/8052 emulator. https://github.com/jarikomppa/emu8051
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